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Abstract 
This thesis examines determinants that can help explain CEO remuneration in an Asian 
emerging market, focusing on Indonesia. Our sample consists of 46 Indonesian stock listed 
companies, and we use data from recently expanded rules on disclosure to analyze the level 
and structure of compensation for the CEO - domestically known as the president director. 
Looking at corporate governance arrangements, firm performance, and CEO characteristics, 
our empirical evidence reveals a significant positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
pay. No further significant relationships are found between CEO compensation and our 
remaining determinants, but we find that firms owned by the Indonesian Government are 
larger in size than family-owned firms, hence they compensate their CEOs higher than those 
owned by families. Finally our thesis adds to the general understanding of international 
corporate governance issues, and our findings suggest a low level of disclosure on CEO 
remuneration in Indonesia. 
Keywords: CEO compensation, corporate governance, company performance,          
determinants, Indonesia 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Rationale of the Study 
During the last two decades there has been a growing interest around top executive 
remuneration (Economist, 2007), combined with an increase in strategic international 
managerial labor markets for the CEO (Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, & Murphy, 2009). After 
having half a century with a  stable ratio of CEO compensation to median earnings, ratings 
began to increase substantially, first in the United States in the 1980s and some years later 
elsewhere until peaking in the U.S. around year 2000 (Economist, 2007), causing 
international CEO pay to slowly converge against U.S. levels as the premium was greatly 
reduced from 2000 to 2006 (Fernandes, et al., 2009). In a recent study on CEO remuneration 
in 4.164 firms in 27 countries, Fernandes et al., (2009) found that Asian CEOs receive the 
lowest average remuneration, and they stated that:  
While the United States‟ status as “the” preeminent economic superpower is increasingly 
challenged by the European Union and emerging Asian economies, there is one sector 
where U.S. dominance seems fairly secure: top executive compensation. U.S. executives 
are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts, and receive a greater share of 
their compensation in the form of stock options, restricted shares and performance-based 
bonuses (p. 1). 
With scandals such as Barings Bank, WorldCom, Enron, Goldman Sachs, and various 
bankruptcies during the latest global financial crisis (e.g. Lehman Brothers and Washington 
Mutual), weak corporate governance within firms has been widely debated. In a study, Millar, 
Eldomiaty, Choi, and Hilton (2005) emphasize the importance of having effective corporate 
governance systems combined with strong ethical values throughout the world. They further 
claim that no nation has a perfect governance system, but rather that the best system would 
come from combining several existing successful systems (Millar, et al., 2005), helping non-
related shareholders and other outsiders to use CEO pay as a test of the board‟s ability of 
monitoring the executives (Economist, 2007). While within rich economies, governments 
have started implementing new corporate governance codes and a disclosure of remuneration 
from the corporations (Economist, 2007), emerging nations still struggle with low 
transparency levels and weak corporate governance (World Bank, 2010). 
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The empirical part of this thesis is based on a sample from Indonesian listed companies. We 
chose Indonesia because we find both their past history and future economic potential 
particularly interesting. Indonesia is a member of the ASEAN-China free trade arrangement– 
the largest regional trading area in the world (Financial Times, 2010); which we argue will 
open the door for many great economic possibilities in the future.  For instance, an article 
written in the Economist (2010) regarding emerging markets proposed that “the biggest praise 
will be for Indonesia: it will be the emerging-market star of 2011, with analysts lauding its 
innovative companies, growing middle class and relative political stability”. 
Indonesia is an emerging market and a developing nation that recently seems to attract the 
attention of foreign investors. In an article in the Norwegian newspaper Dagens Næringsliv, 
Bjørndal (2010) explains that the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) grew the most of all 
stock markets in 2009 increasing by a staggering 120 percent, and that foreign investments 
more than doubled. He further explains that the domestic demand is the biggest factor on 
Indonesian economic growth (Bjørndal, 2010),which could indicate that the performance of 
companies may not be as affected by the recent financial crisis as in nations with economies 
depending on international demand. This view is further supported by an Indonesian study 
where Tambunan (2011) suggests that Indonesia, largely due to an increase in inward foreign 
direct investments (IFDI) weathered the 2008/2009 international financial crisis better than 
many other nations (Tambunan, 2011).  
In an Indonesian context, despite the implementation of several codes of good corporate 
governance following the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 (World Bank, 2010), transparency 
on remuneration disclosure still seems low. In fact, for Indonesian listed companies, CEO pay 
is rarely directly disclosed (Fernandes, et al., 2009; World Bank, 2010), and we could not find 
previous studies directly related to CEO compensation in Indonesian listed companies. Hence 
this thesis attempts to find the determinants which can help explain Indonesian CEO 
compensation, and the main focus will be trying to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance, company performance, and CEO remuneration in Indonesia. 
1.2 The Indonesian Economy 
To better explain the economic history and current situation in the Indonesian economy, we 
have decided to first present a brief history where we try to point out the relevant factors that 
have contributed to how Indonesian firms look today, suitable to further explain the level of 
CEO remuneration in Indonesia. We believe that their history is both unique and interesting, 
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and being faced with so many challenges and different regimes, their way to prosperity is not 
given easily. Another interesting point is how Singapore – neighboring country and also a  
former colony - has become a developed market and financial center of the world, while 
Indonesia is still an emerging nation with a high corruption level that may indicate improper 
CEO compensation and under-the-table arrangements (Thompson, Strickland, & Gamble, 
2010).  
First we should keep in mind that during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, Holland, through the Dutch 
East India Company, started colonizing Indonesia (then known as part of the Dutch East 
Indies), and controlled important sea routes to Europe. However, as the British acquired 
Singapore in 1819, the maritime roads to Europe instead became controlled by the British 
until 1942. This left the Dutch focusing on their established holdings, mainly in Java and a 
few outlying areas (Fisher, 1972). Indonesia finally became independent after four years of 
negotiations, ongoing hostilities, and interference of the UN, when the Netherlands in 1949 
finally agreed upon the transfer of sovereignty (CIA, 2011).   
The result of misplaced and lack of new capital investment, combined with an uncontrolled 
spending, steered the national economy towards a state of collapse, as a military coup led by 
General Soeharto in 1966, gave reason to a huge change in the Indonesian economy, which is 
known as the New Order (Fisher, 1972). 
1.2.1 Entrenchment of the New Order and the Indonesian Stock Market 
The New Order government, led by Soeharto, early on discovered the deficiency of a lacking 
stock market in the financial system of Indonesia, with one of the main arguments being that 
the economy was too dependent on the banking sector. Deciding to re-open the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange (JSX) in 1977 after two decades of inactivity
1
 initially proved to be more symbolic 
than economically viable. Given the fact that there were few large firms in the economy, and 
that many of them were either owned by the government or under ownership of foreign 
investors, these firms were not dependent on equity financing from the domestic public 
(Kung, Carverhill, & McLeod, 2010). According to IDX (2011), the activity of stock trading 
in JSX was low, consisting of only 24 listed companies, most people preferred investing their 
money in banks rather than in the capital markets. In their study on the Indonesian Stock 
Market, Kung, Carverhill and McLeod (2010) explain that the per capita income and savings 
                                                          
1
 For two decades the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) had been inactive under the rule of former President 
Sukarno. It was re-opened on August 10
th
 1977 (IDX). 
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were still low in this period, giving a low demand for pension funds and life insurance 
companies from the private sector. This led them to the conclusion that the re-activation of 
JSX was not market driven but rather driven by the government, a view that the low volumes 
on JSX supports (IDX, 2011).  
According to Tambunan (2011), inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) in Indonesia has 
been, and still is, an important aspect of the economic growth and development process. 
Following the first investment law on Foreign Investment in 1967 amended by Law Number 
II in 1970, FDI flows into Indonesia were relatively high. During this period the IFDI in 
Indonesia was mainly concentrated in the primary sector of the natural gas and oil industry. 
To cope with this narrow investment picture, the Soeharto government introduced numerous 
deregulations in order to liberalize its domestic market and boost IFDI in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. The main idea was to use these deregulations and also incentives to 
reduce the nation‟s dependence on the primary sector. These measurements proved to have a 
positive effect on diversity in the economic structure of Indonesia, and since then the 
secondary and tertiary sectors have attracted more foreign investments to the country 
(Tambunan, 2011). 
An implementation of a series of reforms and rules in December 1987 gave fuel to the growth 
of the Indonesian stock market, allowing some important favorable changes. First, a new 
policy overruled the old policy that prohibited foreign investors from purchasing shares in 
listed companies. The new rule allowed up to 49% ownership by foreign investors on all 
shares except banks. The 49% limit rule was lifted for non-bank stocks in 1997 and for bank 
shares in 1998. Second, a former restriction that prohibited stocks having daily price 
movements no larger than 4% was removed. As a result, the Jakarta Composite Index went 
from 80 points in 1987 to 305 points in late 1988 (Kung, et al., 2010).   
In the years before the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 the banking sector, as already 
mentioned, was a dominant force in the Indonesian financial system. We can see from Table 
1-1 below that bank loans held a larger percentage of the GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) than 
the stock market capitalization up until 2003.  
1.2.2 Changes in Economic Policy: Reformasi 
The Asian financial and currency crisis also lead to the resignation of President Soeharto on 
21 May 1998, after 31 years of rule, and a new era known as reformasi started. With high 
foreign debt and an extreme inflation, banks collapsing, companies going bankrupt and 
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millions of people losing their jobs, he had no choice but to resign. Also, the number of 
Indonesian citizens living below the poverty line increased from 20 to 100 million, making up 
nearly 50% of the entire population (Lonely Planet, 2011). 
Kingsbury (2007) asserts that since 1998 the gap between economic- and population growth 
in Indonesia was mainly due to a low foreign investment level. In addition, the foreign-export 
of oil and natural gas from Indonesia was declining, and with oil even being imported due to 
lack of capital investments in the domestic oil and gas industry (Kingsbury, 2007). In 1999, 
the Indonesian economy started to regain strength, though IFDI did not begin increasing until 
2002. Related to this increase, Asia has been the major source region of IFDI in Indonesia, 
followed by Europe and Africa. Amongst Asian investors in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore are the main Southeast Asian investors, followed by Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong (China), Taiwan Province of China, India, and China. Despite the fact that FDI 
inflows are becoming more diversified by sectors, the primary sector still remains the key 
IFDI sector, with coal, gold, oil, and natural gas industries accounting for nearly 72% of total 
Indonesian IFDI stock (Tambunan, 2011). 
The National Committee on Governance issued a new good corporate governance code in 
2006, encouraging more listings on the stock market, while also introduced a new code of 
ethics for the representatives selling mutual funds. Following these issues came some new 
company laws in 2007, meant to govern both transparency and disclosure in annual reports 
and financial statements of all the listed companies (Kung, et al., 2010).  
Checking data from IDX (2011) in the table below, we can see that there was a rapid growth 
on JSX from around March/April 2003 until late 2007 when the financial crisis hit. With a 
market capitalization growing nearly 10 times from Rp 200 trillion at the end of 1998 to 
around Rp 2000 trillion in late 2007, we see a change from the previous dominance of banks 
in the financial markets. Finally in 2007, JSX and SSX merged into IDX.  
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JSX/IDX 
Index
a
 
Number 
of Firms 
Market 
Capitalization 
Bank 
Loans 
   Rp trillion % of GDP Rp trillion % of GDP 
1987 82.6 24 0.1 0.1 32.9 28.7 
1988 305.1 24 0.5 0.3 42.5 28.4 
1989 399.7 56 4.4 2.4 62.9 35.0 
1990 417.8 122 12.4 5.9 97.0 46.0 
1991 247.4 141 16.4 6.6 112.8 45.1 
1992 274.3 153 24.8 8.8 122.9 43.5 
1993 588.8 172 69.3 21.0 147.3 44.7 
1994 469.6 218 103.8 27.2 187.6 49.1 
1995 513.9 248 157.4 34.6 234.6 51.6 
1996 637.4 267 193.5 36.3 293.1 55.0 
1997 401.7 306 156.8 25.0 378.1 60.2 
1998 398.0 288 175.9 18.4 545.4 57.1 
1999 676.9 277 206.7 18.8 277.3 25.2 
2000 416.3 287 226.1 16.3 320.4 23.1 
2001 392.0 316 231.3 14.1 358.6 21.8 
2002 425.0 331 268.4 14.7 410.3 22.5 
2003 691.9 333 460.4 22.9 477.2 23.7 
2004 1,000.2 331 679.9 29.6 595.1 25.9 
2005 1,162.6 336 801.3 28.9 730.2 26.3 
2006 1,805.5 344 1,249.1 37.4 832.9 24.9 
2007 2,745.8 383 1,988.3 50.2 1,045.7 26.4 
a 
The Jakarta and Surabaya Stock Exchanges (JSX and SSX, respectively) were merged to form the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2007. 
Table 1-1: Stock market activity and bank lending (Kung, et al., 2010) p. 333 
The status on December 31
st
 2009, which is the last day concerning our data analysis (annual 
reports from 2007-2009), is that the market capitalization in stock was Rp 2 010.37 trillion 
(IDX) or as little as 22.08%
2
 of the GDP, recessing to lower levels than before both the Asian 
financial and economic crisis in 1997/1998 and the global economic crisis in 2007/2008. In 
contrast to a lower market capitalization and despite a small decline in FDI flows in 2009, 
Tambunan (2011) asserted that: 
Indonesia still faces some uncertainties relating to the implementation of regional 
autonomy and to the high costs of running businesses caused by inadequate infrastructure, 
restrictive labor regulations and corruption. Nevertheless, the availability of vast reserves 
of highly diversified natural resources, a huge domestic market potential, a cheap labor 
                                                          
2
 Using the end of 2009 market capitalization of stocks in IDX divided by the  2009 GDP of $974.6 billion (CIA) 
converted into Rp 9146,6 trillion using the end of 2009 exchange rate of Rp 9385/$ (StockNod).   
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force, and continued reforms in the direction of a market-based economy, including 
privatizations and open access to almost all sectors, are likely to boost IFDI (p. 1).    
1.2.3 History of the Indonesian Economy in Relation to Chinese Big Business in 
Indonesia 
First, it is in order to define Chinese in context with this thesis. Chua (2008) refers to Ethnic 
Chinese living in Indonesia as Chinese Indonesians or Sino Indonesians. An assertion from 
1998 explains that the Chinese only make up 3.5% of the population in Indonesia, but control 
as much as roughly 70% of the economy. Before the Asian economic crisis in 1997/1998 and 
the fall of long-time dictator Soeharto in May 1998, 26 of the top 30 business conglomerates 
in Indonesia were Chinese (Chua, 2008). According to Sato (1994), a business group can be 
called a conglomerate if more than five companies are under the ownership of the same 
person or his family. How do so few people control such a large portion of the wealth in 
Indonesia? For instance, Yoshihara (1995) claimed that: 
One can easily hypothesize that one basic reason [for the poor economic performance of 
some countries in the ASEAN region (e.g. Indonesia)] is that their culture lacks a strong 
work ethic. If this is true, the dominance of the ethnic Chinese in the capitalist sector of the 
economy (or the private sector as a whole) can be a result of it, instead of its cause. 
Chua (2008) concludes that even after the fall of the New Order and the introduction of 
reformasi, the conglomerates managed to prosper despite of the financial crisis and other 
challenges. The big businesses showed their maturity as capitalists, retained their position as 
economic leaders, and even influenced the scope and outcomes set out by the new 
governments. In defense of the Indonesian people, you may also look at the historical facts 
from colonization. Fisher (1972) claims that:  
What in effect the Dutch had done throughout their period of colonial rule, and certainly 
not least since the Dutch East India Company had been abolished in 1798, had been to 
treat the country as a kind of giant business concern. Development had been successively 
concentrated in a few well selected places to give the maximum return for a localized 
expenditure on infrastructure, and the rest had for all practical purposes been ignored, or 
rather held in reserve until they were needed (p. 156). 
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And he summarizes it by saying: 
Thus, when the Indonesians at last began in 1950 to set their new state in order, they were 
faced with a formidable accumulation of unresolved problems to tackle, and it says much 
for the good sense of their economic experts that they at first set about this task along 
eminently sensible lines, which in fact were basically similar to those adopted by the Dutch 
a decade earlier (p. 157).  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Following the first chapter with a short introduction and research problem, this thesis consists 
of six more chapters, making up seven sections in total. Chapter 2 presents specific and 
general theory relevant for our study on corporate governance and the determinants of CEO 
compensation in Indonesia. In Chapter 3, we develop our hypotheses based on the theory and 
previous literature that can be related to this study.  Having developed our hypotheses we 
describe the data and methodology in Chapter 4 in order to test our hypotheses. These 
multivariate relationships are tested in Chapter 5 after first presenting descriptive and 
bivariate analysis. We discuss and review these results in Chapter 6, seeking to evaluate our 
hypotheses.  Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize our key findings in a conclusion and make 
recommendations for further studies, while also commenting on the limitations of our study.
 
9 
2 Theory 
2.1 Relevant Theoretical Background for the Study 
2.1.1 Stakeholders 
Regarding the compensation of the CEO, there are several stakeholders that have to be 
considered. These stakeholders have a bound interest in the performance of the company and 
the fair compensation of the CEO based on his performance-related potential. 
In a wide context, there exist many stakeholders involved in making a corporation successful 
and who may or may not have a direct or indirect impact on CEO remuneration. For instance, 
a complete list of stakeholders would include the executives, other employees, the 
shareholders, the community, as well as the customers and suppliers of the organization 
(Ellig, 2007). As we are to explore the organizational bodies which have a direct impact on 
the remuneration of the CEO, we will focus on the three major stakeholders that is; the top 
executive (the CEO), the supervisory board (Board of Directors), and the Shareholders.  
2.1.1.1 The Top Executive 
The CEO is the highest ranking executive in an organization. He has the executive 
responsibility for running the company business (Mallin, 2010b), with responsibilities 
concerning day to day operations of the organization, planning and implementing corporate 
strategies, explore opportunities for expansion, and make sure of a profitable business. The 
CEO reports to the Board of Directors. 
Notice that in an Indonesian context, the equivalent of the CEO is the President Director. As 
Indonesian companies have a two-tier board structure, the title of the top executive relates to 
the head of the management board. His responsibilities are, however, the same as that 
presented for the CEO above. This difference in board structure in Indonesian companies will 
be accounted for in greater detail in the chapter Corporate Governance in Indonesia.  
2.1.1.2 The Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board, commonly known as the Board of Directors, acts as the shareholders‟ 
agent in charge of running the company (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010a). The Board of 
Directors is in theory the voice of the owners. As large corporations normally are owned by 
multiple shareholders, it would be difficult for all the shareholders to make any unified 
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decisions regarding the company. Thus the main objective of the board is to make sure that 
the shareholders‟ interests are attended to. 
To avoid any confusion, it is essential to explain the difference in the titling of the supervisory 
board in Indonesia and the general description made above. In the literature, the Board of 
Directors is commonly referred to as the supervisory board that is directly liable to the 
shareholders. In Indonesia, however, the supervisory board is entitled the Board of 
Commissioners, and the management board (headed by the CEO/President Director) is 
entitled Board of Directors. The Board of Commissioners has the same responsibilities as 
presented in the general statement concerning the Board of Directors made in the first 
paragraph of this sub-chapter. 
2.1.1.2.1 The Chairman of the Board 
The chairman of the supervisory board is elected to preside over the board and the committees 
of the board. The duties of the chairman involve ensuring that meetings run smoothly, and 
work towards the consensus in board decisions.  
2.1.1.3 The Shareholders 
The Shareholders are the owners of a corporation, and their ownership consists of shares of 
stock in the company. They own the part of the company that equals the proportion of shares 
they own (Blacksacademy). A publicly listed company offers shares of stock for any private 
or commercial investor, so the number and variety of owners may add up to a vast number of 
different shareholders, both national as well as international. 
Shareholders are entitled to a portion of the profits, directly related to the performance and 
success of the company. They receive their share of the profits in the form of dividends 
(Blacksacademy), depending if the company chooses to use a profit surplus to either pay 
dividends to its shareholders or retain the earnings to re-invest them in the company. 
2.1.1.4 Modifications 
In the next chapters, you will notice that the abbreviation „CEO‟ is used as the reference to the 
top executive and „Board of Directors‟ as the term for the supervisory board. The reason for 
this is that we explain theory in a more general perspective, and in order not to confuse the 
reader more than necessary, we use the popular terms for the top executive and supervisory 
board.  
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2.1.2 CEO Compensation 
As with any other employment relation, the CEO of a company will receive a compensatory 
remuneration for his efforts.  The nature of this compensation, however, is structured 
differently than a normal pay practice of salary based payment. Company executives are 
compensated in many different ways (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010c) and compensation 
practices vary with company size, industry and country (Murphy, 1999). How they are 
compensated and which factors contribute to determine the size and composition of the total 
compensation of the CEO, is a subject that attracts the attention of academic researchers as 
well as the popular press.  
Even though there exist great differences in the structure of CEO pay across countries 
(Murphy, 1999), there seems to be a basic list of components that make up the total 
compensation of the CEO. Murphy (1999) describes the four following components as the 
reoccurring most common parts of any CEO compensation package; a base salary, an annual 
bonus tied to accounting performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans. These 
components will be explained in greater detail below.   
CEO compensation is a widely debated subject. Especially in the U.S., UK and many other 
European countries, there have been public cries about “Fat cat” pay and excessive 
compensation of executives (Tyson, 2005). This gives fuel to the already controversial subject 
of CEOs being paid too much considering their responsibilities. The Board of Directors - in 
some cases represented by a Remuneration Committee - is in charge of the compensation of 
the CEO on behalf of the shareholders. It has been theorized that CEO compensation to some 
degree is a result of the CEOs relation with, and control over, the Board of Directors. 
Executives have a substantial influence on the mechanisms that govern their employment 
(Shijun Cheng & Indjejikian, 2009), which implies a severe agency problem between the 
executives of the company and the shareholders, as CEOs are often more interested in empire 
building and personal wealth, than maximizing shareholder value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Murphy, 1999). Combs & Skill (2003) have confirmed the idea regarding influence of the 
CEO; “Pay premiums are the result of executives‟ ability to influence the compensation 
process. According to human capital theory, pay premiums represent compensation for unique 
and valuable managerial skills” (p. 63).   
There is a massive and well documented theoretical and empirical literature on CEO 
compensation, but there are still many issues left worthy of research (Murphy, 1999). 
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Especially regarding factors that drive CEO pay, the trend shows that CEO compensation is 
rising, but why? As mentioned, the composition of CEO pay varies from country to country. 
By examining the composition of the remuneration and explore which determinants explain 
each one, it might provide us with some answers. In our case and our focus on the emerging 
market of Indonesia, it can be interesting to see whether or not the same norm of conduct 
applies also here, as there is a vast scarcity of research done particularly on Indonesia.  
2.1.2.1 Base Salary 
The foundation of CEO compensation is the base salary, or a specific annual salary, which is 
typically determined through the benchmarking method (Murphy, 1999). This involves the 
Board of Directors, or the Remuneration Committee, doing a survey on peer CEO levels of 
salary for comparison.  These surveys report a variety of pay percentiles, where salaries less 
than the 50
th
 percentile are considered under market, while salaries in the 50
th
 to 75
th
 
percentile are considered competitive (Kim, et al., 2010c). In effect this means that a CEO is 
compensated by comparative pay, regardless of his age, experience, education and 
performance. To the extent that base salaries reflect any of these potentially important 
variables, they are reflected in discretionary adjustments in the target percentiles rather than 
incorporated as a formal criteria (Murphy, 1999). 
One explanation for the rise of CEO compensation lies in the sphere of base salary. CEOs 
argue for competitive salaries, and if each CEO receives a salary above the median, the 
median salary will go up as a result. This way, we can observe that each year executives 
receive raises and also observe that new CEOs earn more than current CEOs (Kim, et al., 
2010c). 
The risk-averse CEO would prefer a high base salary as compared to any other forms of 
compensation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). With a fixed pay, whatever the CEO does, he will 
receive the fixed salary. As with any bonus- or variable compensation that is related to 
different performance measures, the final compensation figure is more uncertain and induces 
more personal risk on the individual CEO. A second argument is that most components of 
compensation are measured relative to the base salary level, while option grants are expressed 
as a multiple of base salary. In that regard, any increase in base salary will have positive 
repercussions on the other components and in effect the total compensation of the CEO 
(Murphy, 1999). 
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2.1.2.2 Annual Bonus 
According to Murphy (1999), most companies offer its top executives an annual cash bonus 
based on the previous years‟ performance, primarily based on accounting profits or share 
price performance. The size of the bonus will depend on how well the performance goals are 
met. He further organizes the executive bonus plans into three categories; performance 
measures, performance standards, and the structure of the pay-performance relation.  
Performance measures are based on accounting related profits. Usual accounting performance 
measures include revenues, net income, ROE, ROA, EBIT, and EVA. Since bonus plans most 
commonly depend on the dollar-value of profits, they also frequently depend on profits on 
EPS (Murphy, 1999). 
Performance standards are the specific goals for each performance measure. This is the level 
of performance the CEO is supposed to achieve in order to be granted the annual bonus. No 
bonus is paid until a threshold performance (a percentage of the performance standard) is 
achieved (Murphy, 1999), which means that the minimum of what can be expected to be paid 
as a bonus is paid at this threshold level. 
Pay-performance relation is in simple terms the relation between the bonus amount paid, and 
the corresponding level of performance achieved. In the bonus compensation plan, there will 
be a bonus “cap” which implies there is a top limit to the amount characteristics of the bonus. 
The most common payout method is the so-called “80 / 120” plan. Under this plan, no bonus 
is paid unless performance exceeds 80% of the performance standard and bonuses are capped 
when performance exceeds 120% of the performance standard (Murphy, 1999).  
Setting performance standards and paying bonus accordingly, serve as an incentive 
arrangement to ensure that the CEO seeks to attain profits. However, this may cause agency 
problems when the CEO is measured relative to the standard, as he will attempt to control the 
standard-setting process (Murphy, 1999). The logic behind this argument is that performance 
standards will be set to mirror the previous period. A CEO would feel he is being penalized 
when reaching a premium performance goal, only to realize the performance standard is rising 
in the next period making it harder to obtain the same level of performance, and in effect 
obtain the preferred bonus.  
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2.1.2.3 Stock Options 
Stock options are well known integrated elements in the incentive plan of corporate 
executives. Most of the options expire in 10 years and are granted with exercise prices that 
should equal the market value (Murphy, 1999). Black and Scholes (1973) state that an option 
is: 
 ….a security giving the right to buy or sell an asset, subject to certain conditions, within a 
specified period of time. An "American option" is one that can be exercised at any time up 
to the date the option expires. A "European option" is one that can be exercised only on a 
specified future date. The price that is paid for the asset when the option is exercised is 
called the "exercise price" or "striking price." The last day on which the option may be 
exercised is called the "expiration date" or "maturity date." (p. 637). 
The most common and simple option is the call option, which basically gives you the right to 
buy a single share of common stock on an agreed upon price in the future; the exercise price. 
Generally we can say that the higher the price of the stock, the greater the value of the option. 
If the stock price is much greater than the exercise price, the option will nearly always be 
executed. Should the value of the stock decrease below the exercise price, it is nearly sure not 
to be exercised; hence the value of option will be close to zero (Black & Scholes, 1973).  
To implement the stock option plan, it is needed to get a vote of approval from the 
shareholders. Post of this approval the board of directors will generally assign the 
remuneration committee to administer the stock option plan. The remuneration committee 
will then decide for both the size and timing of these stock option grants (Lie, 2005). 
Murphy (1999) claims that stock options give a direct link between managerial rewards and 
appreciation of the share-price. An executive holding a stock option will gain incentives to 
avoid dividends and favor share repurchasing. The reason for this is that the stock options 
only reward appreciation of the stock-price, and not the total shareholder return (that also 
includes dividends). He furhter puts emphasis on the theory that an executive will pursue 
riskier investments in order to gain higher volatility on the stock price, which in turn will 
increase the value of the stock option (Murphy, 1999).  
2.1.2.4 Long-Term Incentive Plans 
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are an extension of the annual bonus plan described above. 
As with a bonus arrangement, the LTIPs compensation effect revolves around performance, 
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typically based on rolling-average 3- or 5- years cumulative performance (Murphy, 1999). In 
other words, an LTIP is an incentive tool used to encourage long-term performance goals.  
LTIPs usually consists of stock option plans, stock appreciation rights (SARs), restricted 
stock and performance plans (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). However, the most necessary 
condition for LTIP adoption is the performance plan. A performance plan gives the executive 
the right to receive shares of common stock or cash at a particular date in the future, given 
that specific performance goals are met (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), typically accounting-based 
performance goals (Larcker, 1983). Larcker (1983) argues that LTIPs can lengthen 
executives‟ time horizon and focus their attention on creating shareholder value. 
2.1.2.5 Other Forms of Compensation 
The above methods have received the most attention from researchers and are most frequently 
mentioned in published articles on the field. As complements to the basic compensation 
methods described above, the pay of a CEO may consist of other forms of compensation as 
well. The subchapters below describe more peripheral ways of compensating the CEO, which 
are not as common, or are not such a big part, of the total compensation package.  
2.1.2.5.1 Restricted Stock 
Restricted stock is common stock of the company, limited to a certain length of time or 
certain goals to be achieved before realization of the stock is possible (Kim, Nofsinger, & 
Mohr, 2010d). Compared to stock options, restricted stock has the advantage that it will not 
decrease to zero when the stock price falls, and has in that respect, not the same asymmetric 
characteristics as a stock option. Restricted stock is also a common part of LTIPs (Murphy, 
1999). 
2.1.2.5.2 Retirement Plans 
In addition to be involved with regular company retirement plans, executives also participates 
in SERPs - Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (Murphy, 1999). SERPs can take a 
variety of forms, like defined benefits based on credited years of service or other non-fixed 
benefits based on inflation or performance (Murphy, 1999). When the CEO leaves the 
company he will receive any performance shares the company owes him, and he can sell any 
options or restricted stock he has accumulated over his period as CEO (Kim, Nofsinger, & 
Mohr, 2010e). For many CEOs, the possibilities a retirement plan represents vast amounts of 
personal profits, most commonly referred to as a golden parachute. 
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2.1.2.5.3 Perquisites 
A perquisite in a work related setting, is defined as a “non-monetary compensation (…) not 
strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the employee‟s duties” (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). In 
other words, a perquisite is a privilege achieved through ones employment in the form of 
tangible benefits not related to a monetary compensation. Examples of perks for CEOs are 
company cars, club memberships (golf clubs, country clubs, and the like), catered lunches, 
luxurious office accessories, private jets, and similar.  
Perks can be the result of a contractual agreement related to the CEO‟s terms of employment. 
When this is the case, perks are used as a direct incentive to increase executive performance; 
they provide a psychic value to the recipient that exceeds their direct cost to the company 
(Yermack, 2006), as they will increase the sense of status perceived by the CEO. Not only 
will this contribute to clarifying and reinforcing the chain of command, it can also help 
improve productivity. Rajan and Wulf (2006) present these as rational expenditures, or value-
increasing business expenses. According to Maslow (1943), an individual will have reached 
his full potential when all the levels of his hierarchy of needs are fulfilled. The latter of these 
levels are connected to self-actualization, of which an important building block is the sense of 
status and accomplishment. This is a theory that can help explain the incentive effect of a 
perquisite incentive plan. 
As mentioned, perquisites may arise as a result of a contractual agreements to the position, but 
also as a result of weak governance (Yermack, 2006). Perquisites resulting from weak 
governance manifest themselves as e.g. misuse of company assets by the CEO. This relates 
heavily to Jensen & Mecklings‟ (1976) agency problem theory, and is a large issue 
concerning apparent incentive problems related to this method of compensation.  If executives 
have a great on-the-job consumption, more than desired by the shareholders, it will reduce 
firm value directly. A more indirect reduction of firm value appears if workers located lower 
than the CEO in the hierarchical structure, observe the behavior of the CEO and then react 
adversely. Perks can, in this way, catalyze shirking, unethical behavior or low moral through 
the company (Yermack, 2006). 
2.1.2.5.4 Rents 
Tollison (1982) describes economic rents as the excess returns given for goods and services 
provided above normal standards and norms in a competitive market. In other words, you may 
say that it is the excess return related to the opportunity cost of the resource owner. Johnson 
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and Pasour (1981) defined opportunity cost as “the value of a resource in the best alternative 
use”. 
2.1.3 Corporate Governance 
2.1.3.1 Introduction to Corporate Governance 
The subject of corporate governance relates to the standards and improvement of corporate 
responsibility, transparency, accountability, fairness, and compliance within the company and 
in all dealings with the company shareholders. Its purpose is to facilitate an effective and 
prudent management to ensure the long-term success of the firm (FRC, 2010). 
The Cadbury report defines corporate governance as the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled (FRC, 2010), with the Board of Directors as those responsible for the 
governance of the companies. Their responsibilities include setting the company‟s strategic 
aims, appoint executives and management to put those strategic aims into effect, supervising 
the management, and finally report back to the shareholders. The shareholders, on the other 
hand, hold the role of electing the directors and appoint auditors. As the owners of the 
company, they have to ensure themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. 
The relationships in a traditional corporate governance structure are illustrated in the figure 
below; 
 
Figure 2-1: Classic corporate governance structure (C. Boyd, 1996) 
The field of corporate governance is an evolving area, and its development has been driven by 
the desire for transparency and accountability to help restore investor confidence in the 
world‟s stock markets after financial scandals and corporate collapses (Mallin, 2010a). Both 
investors and governments have been proactive in an effort to ensure that corporate boards are 
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more accountable, and that they act in the best interest of the shareholders. The demand for 
independent board members playing a key role in the board structure, introduction of audit-, 
nomination- and remuneration committees and ensuring that external auditing firms are able 
to perform their audits properly, are measures to ensure and protect shareholder interests. 
(Mallin, 2010a) 
Corporate governance codes of conduct are not mandated by law, but rather as standards or 
guidelines to form a basis for the companies to follow. As such, companies are not legally 
bound to comply with any such code, but they may be committed to do so as a result of listing 
requirements on the stock exchange or to satisfy the demands of the stakeholders (FRC, 
2010). 
In order to help standardize codes of corporate governance, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed a set of principles on request of the 
OECD council (Mallin, 2010a). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and their collective initiative named Reports on Observed Standards and Codes (ROSCs), use 
these principles to help member countries improve awareness and implementation of 
corporate governance codes, among other issues. 
2.1.3.2 Corporate Governance Codes 
Whilst there are many corporate governance codes and guidelines that have had an impact on 
corporate governance practices in countries around the world, there are some that have had a 
more fundamental influence and that will be covered in the next subchapters. 
2.1.3.2.1 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a set of standards and guidelines to form an 
international standardization of corporate governance codes (Mallin, 2010a). The OECD 
principles are non-binding, and they represent merely a proposal of which key elements to 
include.  Functioning as guidelines, the OECD acknowledges that these codes may not be 
applicable to all types of countries, but they represent a majority of the practices of corporate 
governance across the world (Mallin, 2010a). The 6 principles are as follows, quoted from the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004): 
 
: 
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Principle Narrative 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework 
The corporate governance framework should 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate 
the division of responsibilities among different 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities 
II. The rights of shareholders and key 
ownership functions 
The corporate governance framework should protect 
and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights 
III. The equitable treatment of shareholders The corporate governance framework should ensure 
the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders 
should have the opportunity to obtain effective 
redress for violation of their rights 
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance 
The corporate governance framework should 
recognize the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises 
V. Disclosure and transparency The corporate governance framework should ensure 
that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company 
VI. The responsibilities of the boards The corporate governance framework should ensure 
the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the 
board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders 
Table 2-1: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
In the same way as the OECD principles, the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly 
known as the Combined Code on Corporate Governance
3
) functions as a set of guidelines and 
provisions to a number of key components to effective board practice (FRC, 2010). Its 
“comply or explain” practice, which means that companies can either comply with the 
recommendations of the Code or explain to the shareholders why they are unable to comply 
(Mallin, 2010a), has been widely imitated across the world.   
Both codes value transparency and shareholder rights. The end-result of implementing such 
codes are long-term stock performance for the investor, lower cost of capital for the firm, and 
enhanced capital formation for the country (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2010). In order to achieve 
this, the structure and composition of the board, the independence of the CEO, the 
                                                          
3
 The UK Code on Corporate Governance followed as a result of revisions made to the Combined Code of 2008, 
which will apply to financial years beginning on or after 29-June-2010 (FRC, 2010).  
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composition of skills and qualified personnel, equal treatment of shareholders, monitoring by 
boards, and incentives for top management are highlighted as crucial issues. A statement of 
these issues will be further discussed in the following chapters.   
2.1.3.2.2 IMF and the World Bank: The ROSC Initiative 
The Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative produces reports on 
the observance of standards and codes that summarize the extent to which countries observe 
internationally recognized standards and codes (IMF, 2011). This includes sections on 
corporate governance, accounting, and auditing. The goal of the initiative is to assess the 
economic and financial vulnerability of a country by identifying its weaknesses. The World 
Bank has established a program to assist countries in strengthening their corporate governance 
frameworks, with the following objectives (World Bank, 2011):  
1) Benchmark the country‟s corporate governance framework and company practices 
against the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance. 
2) Assist the country in developing and implementing a country action plan for 
improving institutional capacity with a view to strengthening the country‟s corporate 
governance framework. 
3) Raise awareness of good corporate governance practices among the country‟s public 
and private sector stakeholders. 
The World Bank conducts their corporate governance assessments under the ROSC initiative 
based on the OECD principles mentioned above
4
.  
2.1.3.3 Corporate Governance and the CEO 
The CEO, in control of day-to-day operations and in charge of maintaining shareholder 
interests, is at risk of taking advantage of the agency relationship between the owners and 
himself (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010b). Corporate governance has evolved partially to 
address this conflict, and in effect, create investor confidence. The logic is simple; when the 
investor is assured measures are in place to protect his interests, he will invest.  
CG codes are in place to make sure the CEO acts on behalf of the shareholders under the 
supervision of the Board of Directors. To make sure he acts according to shareholder interest, 
corporate governance codes of conduct emphasize degrees of transparency and accountability 
                                                          
4
 By the end of June 2010, 75 assessments had been completed in 59 countries around the world (World Bank, 
2011) 
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(Mallin, 2010a). This involves any information required by stakeholders to be made public 
and accessible, while having an effective board structure to supervise and control the CEO.  
2.1.3.3.1 Board Structure 
Looking back to the Stakeholders chapter, we recollect that the Board of Directors leads and 
controls the company and are an extension of the shareholders, creating a link between the 
shareholders and the management (Mallin, 2010b). Pfeffer (1972) stated that “the board of 
directors is considered as an instrument for dealing with the organizations environment” (p. 
218). As seen in Figure 2-1, the board of directors is essential for sustaining an effective 
corporate governance structure. The relation between the board of directors and the CEO are 
of great interest for this thesis, and this chapter seeks to clarify empirical results from this 
relationship.  
Codes of corporate governance seek to implement the effective board. But what is an effective 
board? The textbook answer to this is a board consisting of few members with relevant 
experience and expertise, members with different backgrounds to provide flexibility and 
variation, high fraction of independent board members unaffiliated with the CEO, non-
executive directors, and the existence of board sub-committees (Kim, et al., 2010a; Mallin, 
2010b).  
A small board will not necessarily suffer from the “too-many-chefs” fallacy that large boards 
tend to, and decisions are more likely to be considered independently and evaluated 
thoroughly by each member. Thus making the outcome of any decisions as considerate as 
possible (Kim, et al., 2010a). Complementing the board with members having industry-
specific knowledge and experience will contribute positively to any issue related to the 
attainment of long-term profitability and growth. As for members with different backgrounds, 
these will contribute in giving the board a wide range of expertise. Examples may be a 
member with background in marketing, another in finance, a third in accounting, and so on. 
(Kim, et al., 2010a). Perhaps the most debated and researched phenomenon when it comes to 
board structure and the subject of board effectiveness is the degree of independence among 
board members. An independent board member is, simply stated, a non-insider, one who is 
not previously affiliated with the company, or perhaps most importantly, not affiliated with 
the CEO in any way (Kim, et al., 2010a). The subject of independent board members is a 
reoccurring factor in codes on corporate governance. Excerpts from the earlier presented 
corporate governance codes, indicates a prominent focus on the matter. 
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From the UK Corporate Governance Code;  
The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective 
duties and responsibilities effectively (FRC, 2010).  
And from the OECD principles;  
Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-making of the 
board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the performance of the board 
and management (OECD, 2004).  
The structure of boards, and in extension, the independence of board members, are interesting 
for our thesis as it is evidenced through empirical research that it has an effect on the 
compensation of the top executive. With a more effective board, the total compensation of the 
CEO will have a negative effect. This statement relates to what degree of influence the CEO 
may have over the Board. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) argues that if the Board of 
Directors is influenced by the CEO, the Board does not structure the compensation package to 
maximize value for the shareholders. Evidence from research shows that the independence of 
board members is an increasing tendency, which would make it harder for CEOs to increase 
their pay at the shareholders‟ expense (Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). The agency problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) goes a long way in describing this relation. Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) found that measures of board and ownership structure “explain a significant 
amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation after controlling for standard 
economic determinants of pay” (p. 371) and that firms with a weaker governance structure 
experiences greater agency problems; CEOs at these firms receive greater compensation as 
the monitoring of their actions is poor due to weak corporate governance. The background 
and effect of the agency problem will be presented later in this thesis.  
Jensen (1993) further introduce an argument for why boards are ineffective under influence of 
the CEO; when the CEO has great influence over the board in that he controls the agenda and 
information given to the board, a board culture will develop that discourages conflict as board 
members avoid challenging the CEO in fear of the consequences. Jensen (1993) found that in 
general there is little equity ownership by managers and non-managers on the typical board, 
therefore board members will not have an incentive to limit the power of the CEO, and in turn 
his remuneration package. Another problem related to board effectiveness, is when the CEO 
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holds the position of chairman in the same company which he serves as CEO. This creates a 
severe agency problem concerning CEO duality, which will be explained later.  
Contrary to the above reasoning, Vance (1964) concluded on a study of 103 large companies, 
that on average, inside-dominated boards were superior in performance to outside-dominated 
boards.  
In conclusion, the structure of the board is a crucial determinant to the compensation of the 
CEO. The degree of influence the CEO has over the board will have an effect on the total 
remuneration package and his degree of power. Corporate Governance practices seek to limit 
this influence by proposing measures to be implemented, among them a fraction of 
independent board members in the ranks of the Board. This will in turn aid the goal of 
corporate governance, to protect the interests of the shareholders making sure the CEO is 
compensated fairly and not over-excessive. Finally, we wish to stress that the empirical 
evidence presented above is extracted from studies mainly undertaken in the U.S. and Europe.  
2.1.3.3.2 Unitary and Dual Board Structure 
A unitary board structure is defined as one single supervisory board comprising both 
executive and non-executive directors. The board is responsible for all company activities, 
and the members of the board are all working to achieve the same goal (Mallin, 2010b). The 
directors are elected by the shareholders at the annual general meeting of shareholders 
(AGMS). Unitary boards are most common in the U.S. and UK.  
A dual board structure consists of a supervisory board and an executive board of management 
(Mallin, 2010b). The two boards are clearly separated between the functions of monitoring 
and management. The supervisory board is in charge of overseeing the direction of the 
company, and implement strategic decisions towards maximizing shareholders wealth, while 
the executive board is in charge of the daily operations of the company. The shareholders 
elect the members of the supervisory board, while in turn the supervisory board appoints the 
members of the executive board.  
2.1.3.3.3 Sub-Committees of the Board 
As initially mentioned in the last chapter on board structure, an effective board will appoint a 
number of sub-committees under their control, to help the board of directors delegate various 
activities under the jurisdiction of  the board (Mallin, 2010b). Charkham (2005) defines the 
role of board sub-committees as follows: 
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Committees of the board are used for various purposes, the main one being to assist the 
dispatch of business by considering it in more detail than would be convenient for the 
whole board…the second purpose is to increase objectivity either because of inherent 
conflicts of interest such as executive remuneration, or else to discipline personal 
preferences as in the exercise of patronage (pp. 321-322). 
Sub-committees are designed to relieve the board of some of the more important decisions, 
with providing a more detailed assessment, which in turn has to be approved by the board. 
The increased objectivity introduced as an effect of sub-committees is an important issue 
related to the implementation of corporate governance.  Codes on corporate governance also 
emphasize the use of sub-committees to provide a more objective and neutral board as a 
whole. The codes suggest implementation of at least three sub-committees in particular; (1) 
Audit committee, (2) Nomination committee, and (3) Remuneration committee (FRC, 2010; 
Mallin, 2010b; OECD, 2004). 
The Audit Committee is considered one of the most important sub-committees of the board 
(Mallin, 2010b). According to a review done by sir Robert Smiths (2003), the main purposes 
of the audit committee includes monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the 
company, monitoring and reviewing the internal auditors effectiveness, make 
recommendations to the board in relation to the appointment of external auditor, as well as 
monitoring and reviewing the external auditors independence, objectivity, and effectiveness. 
Further it is proposed that the audit-committee should consist of at least three members, but 
most important, that the members should all be independent non-executives, this to ensure the 
objectivity and effectiveness of the committee.  
The Nomination Committee is important to ensure the correct and effective nomination of 
directors of the board (Mallin, 2010b). To avoid any cronyism related to the appointment of 
new directors, the nomination committee should ensure its objectivity by consisting of a 
majority of independent non-executives (FRC, 2010). 
The Remuneration Committee is the most relevant sub-committee regarding the subject of 
executive compensation. The Remuneration Committee makes recommendations to the board 
on the company‟s policy on compensation of executives and it should determine, on behalf of 
the board, the specific remuneration package to each of the executive directors and 
management (Mallin, 2010b). According to the statements of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (FRC, 2010), the Remuneration Committee should consist of at least three independent 
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non-executive members, and the committee should have delegated the responsibility of setting 
the remuneration for all executives and directors. The establishment of this committee should 
prevent any CEO from determining his own pay. The remuneration committee should decide 
upon a compensation package sufficient to attract, retain, and motivate directors and 
executives to run the company according to the shareholders best interest. 
Other sub-committees worth mentioning are the risk-committee and the ethics-committee. The 
introduction of these committees is not directly recommended by codes of corporate 
governance to the same extent as the above mentioned three. However, the focus of managing 
risk and developing codes of ethics in an organization, is a tool to further streamline the 
corporate structure (Mallin, 2010b).  
2.1.3.3.4 CEO Duality 
We mentioned that the CEO can influence the board to affect his compensation package. 
Core, et al (1999) states that if the board is influenced by the CEO, they will fail to structure 
the compensation package of the CEO to maximize shareholder value. The influence the CEO 
has over the board increases when he entertains two conflicting positions at the same time – 
CEO and chairman of the board. This is known as CEO duality.  
Worrell, Nemec and Davidson (1997) argues that CEO duality causes major agency problems, 
as the idea of one person holding both the position as CEO and chairman of the board is 
inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. It is desirable that these two positions are 
held separate, because otherwise there could be too much power vested in one individual 
(Mallin, 2010b). Agency theory suggests that splitting the titles of CEO and chairman of the 
board between two individuals, will improve firm performance and monitoring of the CEO 
conducted by the board. No matter how relevant the agency problems may be, Harris and 
Helfat (1998) point out that other factors such as succession planning and managerial 
capabilities, will also be related to the issue of consolidating executive titles. 
Hence, CEO duality can be another determining factor explaining the level of compensation 
given to the CEO. When the CEO in addition holds the position as chairman of the board, his 
influence over the board increases consequently and the independence of the board is 
drastically compromised, enabling the CEO to positively influence his own remuneration.  
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2.1.4 Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
After the Asian economic crisis in 97/98, Indonesia experienced an economic reform, of 
which one of the key issues was the focus on corporate governance (Sato, 2003). In the 
aftermath of the crisis, Asian firms experienced a massive negative view upon their 
governance practices. The World Bank (1998) stated on the conditions in Asia that: 
The poor system of corporate governance has contributed to the present financial crisis by 
shielding the banks, financial companies, and corporations from market discipline (p. 67). 
The World Bank further showed in their studies that East Asian firms suffered from high 
leverage, concentrated ownership, high level of control by a few families, and the 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Sato, 2003). The assumption made was that these 
disadvantages led to poor corporate governance. The studies on East Asia also included 
Indonesia, where efforts have been made in the last decade to improve implementation and 
awareness of corporate governance practices of the Anglo-American type. The principles of 
the OECD have had a particular impact on the view on corporate governance practices in 
Indonesia, and a number of regulations and measures have been implemented to improve the 
situation. The ROSC that we mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3.2.2, have made an own report on the 
corporate governance situation in Indonesia, and their findings will be discussed later. First, 
we would like to introduce some of the most important and evident regulations that 
contributes to the ongoing improvement of corporate governance practices in Indonesia.  
2.1.4.1 Regulations 
The subject of corporate governance is a growing issue in Asian economies, and Indonesia is 
no exception. Still lagging somewhat behind on implementation of corporate governance 
practices compared to other countries in the region
5
, Indonesia is on the way. Evidence of this 
is the increasing implementation of regulations on the field (World Bank, 2010), some of 
which the most important will be presented in this chapter.  
2.1.4.1.1 Bapepam LK 
Bapepam LK is an Indonesian acronym for The Capital Market and Non-Bank Financial 
Sector Regulator (Bapepam LK, 2009). The agencies duties include to supervise daily 
activities of the capital market and execute the policies and technical standards in financial 
institutions area, in accordance to policies which have been set by the Ministry of Finance and 
                                                          
5
 India, Thailand and Malaysia in particular (World Bank, 2010) 
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based on prevailing laws and regulations (Bapepam LK, 2009). In performing its duties, the 
agency has the following 11 functions: 
1) Capital market rule making; 
2) Capital market law enforcement; 
3) Monitoring of persons who obtain business licenses, approvals, registrations from the 
agency and other institutions in the capital market area; 
4) Ratification of company disclosure principle for issuers and Public Companies; 
5) Settlement of appeal by Persons imposed sanctions by stock Exchange, Clearing and 
Guarantee Institution, and Custodian and Settlement Institution; 
6) Ratification of accounting provisions in capital market area; 
7) Preparation of policies formulation in financial institutions area; 
8) Execution of policies in financial institutions area in accordance with the current 
regulations; 
9) Formulation of standards, norms, criteria and procedure guidelines in financial 
institutions area; 
10) Providing technical guidance and evaluation in financial institutions area; 
11) Execution of agency administration. 
In exercising its duties, the Bapepam LK has at its disposal 12 offices within its ranks
6
. The 
agency‟s focus on Corporate Governance proves itself in that Bapepam-LK has participated in 
several meetings with the OECD, and other economic bodies in Asia to discuss the subject. 
On a meeting with OECD in March 2009, corporate governance wore among the discussed 
issues, and in September the same year, they met with ARCG in Manila, the Philippines, to 
discuss primarily how to improve corporate governance practices in Asia.  
The power and authority of Bapepam LK is in general terms consistent with what is 
considered international good practice, and it plays a key role in overseeing corporate 
governance practices of the listed companies (World Bank, 2010). The authority of the agency 
extends to the point that they can conduct investigations and inspections whenever they 
suspect any public company of violating capital market acts or its own regulations, and 
consequently enact sanctions
7
 upon the violating company. The regulations of Bapepam LK 
                                                          
6
 Regulation and Legal Counsel; Research and Information Technology; Enforcement; Investment Management; 
Market Institutions and Transactions; Services Sector Corporate Finance; Real Sector Corporate Finance; 
Accounting Standards and Disclosure; Financing and Guarantee; Insurance; Pension Fund; Internal compliance.  
7
 Impose fines and/or reverse decisions made by the GMS, board or management if the decision violates the law.  
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do, to some extent, overlap some aspects of the Company Law, and can directly intervene in a 
number of cases outside the traditional Bapepam LK regulations area. The agency has a good 
reputation in the market, however, there have been concerns about Bapepam LKs relations 
with the government and the degree of influence the government has over the agency. 
Bapepam LK is supposed to be an independent body, but it reports and is responsible to the 
Minister of Finance and it is financially dependent on the state budget for its funding.  
The Bapepam LK maintains and supervises that Company Law and regulations are upheld by 
listed companies, and functions as a watchdog in that regard. It can impose sanctions to those 
who do not comply, and is effectively one of the most important bodies of implementing, 
improving, and supervising good corporate governance in Indonesia.      
2.1.4.1.2 Company Law (40/2007) 
The Company Law 40/2007 was enacted to govern disclosure and transparency in the annual 
reports and financial statements of listed companies (Kung, et al., 2010). In the 161 articles of 
the law, what is of specific interest are the paragraphs explaining the duties for the company 
organs (General Meeting of Shareholders, Board of Commissioners, and Board of Directors), 
and the prerequisites for a good annual report. According to the Company Law (2007), article 
66, §(2):  
The annual reports contemplated in paragraph (1) must contain at least: 
a. a financial report consisting of at least the last balance sheet for the financial year 
just ended in comparison with the previous financial year, a profit and loss 
statement for the financial year concerned, a cash flow report, and a report on 
changes in equity, and notes on the financial report; 
b. a report on the Company‟s activities; 
c. a report on the implementation of Environmental and Social Responsibility; 
d. details of problems which arose during the financial year which influenced the 
Company‟s business activities; 
e. a report on the duty of supervision performed by the Board of Commissioners 
during the financial year just ended; 
f. the names of the members of the Board of Directors and members of the Board of 
Commissioners; 
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g. salaries and allowances for members of the Board of Directors and salaries or 
honoraria and allowances for members of the Board of Commissioners of the 
Company for the year just ended. 
Disclosure of CEO remuneration, described in section g, is of particular importance regarding 
the subject of this thesis. As the ROSC on Indonesia discovered, the disclosure of such 
information is not stated to the detailed extent that would be preferred. This would also prove 
to be a challenge when it comes to our data collection. The ROSC findings and our 
experiences will be discussed later.  
The next articles further explain that all the commissioners and directors should sign the 
report as a sign that they endorse the report and are aware of its contents, and that the 
financial statements should be delivered to a public accountant for auditing. These articles 
embrace the corporate governance principle of reliability and transparency.  
The duties and responsibilities of the supervisory and management boards are covered in 
Chapter VII. For Board of Directors, Article 92, §(1) states: 
Boards of Directors shall undertake the management of Companies in the interest of the 
Companies and in accordance with the Companies‟ purpose and objectives. 
And further in Article 94, §(1): 
Members of Board of Directors shall be appointed by the GMS. 
The same statements are made for the Board of Commissioners in article 108, §(1): 
Boards of Commissioners shall supervise management policies, the running of 
management in general, with regard to both the Company and the Company‟s business, 
and give advice to the Board of Directors 
And in article 111, §(1): 
Members of Boards of Commissioners shall be appointed by GMS. 
The law implies that the classic corporate governance structure, illustrated in Figure 2-1 in 
Chapter 2.1.3.1, is not representative to the structure in Indonesian companies. The Company 
Law further stipulate in article 1 (2) that the Indonesian company consists of the three legal 
entities: the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS), the Board of Directors (BOD) and the 
 
30 
Board of Commissioners (BOC). The relationship between the three company organs, as 
indicated in the quotations above, is illustrated in Figure 2-2 below: 
 
Figure 2-2: Three company organs 
In short, the Company Law contains regulations to promote corporate governance practices, 
and except certain structural designs, the same principles of responsibility, transparency, 
compliance, accountability, and fairness are highly valued in the execution and development 
of corporate governance practices. 
2.1.4.1.3 Capital Market Law (8/1995) 
The Capital Market Law requires issuers and listed companies to file audited annual and 
quarterly financial statements to Bapepam-LK. These should be prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles (Kung, et al., 2010).  
2.1.4.1.4 Investment Laws 
According to Tambunan (2011), foreign investment policies have always been an important 
part of Indonesia‟s economic growth since the „New Order‟ era and he further assert that for 
Indonesia to sustain economic growth, it is essential to attract IFDI. Hence, the Soeharto 
government introduced the Foreign Investment Law (1/1967), which opened possibilities for 
foreign equity participation (Tambunan, 2011). The Indonesian Investment Coordinating 
Board (BKPM) was established in 1973 to administer the Foreign Investment Law of 1967, 
and among their administrative duties they screen any investment applications, grants 
licenses, and permits and offer investment incentives (Tambunan, 2011).  
After the Asian economic crisis of 97/98, the BKPM framework became less relevant due to 
the introduction of the Regional Autonomy Law (RAL)
8
. One of the most important 
                                                          
8
 The RAL empowers the regencies and municipalities, amongst other things, to run their economies, including 
administering governance of investments (Tambunan, 2011). 
GMS 
BOC BOD 
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investment reforms initiated by the Indonesian government, is the Law on Investment 
(25/2007) which is considered to be more „open‟ than FIL no. 1 of 1967. This new law covers 
all private foreign- and domestic investments (Tambunan, 2011). With this new regulation, it 
has been much easier for foreign investors to do business in Indonesia and this may be 
reflected when looking at the ratio of foreign ownership in Indonesian companies during the 
last decade.  
2.1.4.1.5 The National Committee on Governance (NCG) 
The NCG was established on 30 November 2004 with the purpose of enhancing 
comprehension and implementation of good governance in Indonesia and also to advise the 
government on governance issues (KNKG, 2011). The NCG works as an advisory body, 
formulating corporate governance guidelines and dispersing the principles of good corporate 
governance (GCG) by conducting studies and making recommendations to enhance the 
awareness and legislation related to the issue. The NCG issued a Code of Good Corporate 
Governance (CGCG) in 2006, with new regulations to encourage more listings on the stock 
market (Kung, et al., 2010).  
2.1.4.2 Key Findings of the ROSC on Indonesia (2010)9 
The Report on Observed Standards and Codes, in its review on Indonesia, benchmark the 
country‟s corporate governance practice, and policy framework with regard to the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, with focus on the companies listed on the Indonesian 
stock exchange (World Bank, 2010). Recent improvements in corporate governance 
regulation are highlighted in this report, as well as recommendations for further improvement. 
The key findings of the report will be reproduced in this chapter. The Detailed Country 
Assessment of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Indonesia is presented in 
Appendix 2. 
The key findings of the report are divided into achievements and obstacles of corporate 
governance implementation, as well as suggested steps to be taken in order to further improve 
corporate governance in Indonesia. Among the achievements, the report mentions that 
Bapepam LK has continued to introduce and amend its regulations, which in turn has been 
actively enforced to protect investors. In addition, other regulations has been developed and 
amended since the last ROSC assessment in 2004. Among them are the Code of Good 
Corporate Governance (CGCG), the Law on Investment, and a new Company Law; 
                                                          
9
 Update from the 2004 ROSC on Corporate Governance in Indonesia. 
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introducing explicit duties for board members and requirements for information disclosure. 
Other achievements include emplacement of basic shareholder rights (the right to attend and 
cast votes at the GMS) and companies production of more timely and complete reports. A 
higher ratio of independent members in boards of commissioners and the commissioners 
being more professional about their responsibilities are also among the improvements.  
The obstacles Indonesia still face concerning implementation of corporate governance 
principles of western standard, concerns itself with protection of minority shareholders, 
information disclosure and board structure. Despite the new Company Law (2007), the report 
uncovers that commissioners still do not carry out many of the key functions required by the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, especially when it comes to the election of the 
CEO (read: President Director). Another pressing issue is, as mentioned, the rights of 
minority shareholders. According to the report, minority shareholders continue to have little 
or no influence on board member selection. Issues regarding shareholder rights, further extend 
to them having limited rights to access other information from the company. Company 
websites are deficient in information, and information in general is hard to obtain. Even 
though corporate governance statements are a mandatory compliment to the annual report, 
they are limited in their content, which oppose the principles of the OECD of being 
transparent and reliable (OECD, 2004). The annual report should present details on board 
members; qualifications, meeting attendance, independence, board compensation, and 
remuneration policy. In practice, however, most companies only disclose aggregated 
remuneration of the boards, and no more than two percent of the companies listed on IDX 
include remuneration details on an individual level in their annual reports. Basic shareholder 
rights are in place, but the shareholders influence to ask questions not related to the agenda of 
the GMS, or even propose the agenda, is limited at best. The CGCG is still voluntary, and 
unlike the UK and the Corporate Governance Code embodied on UK companies, Indonesian 
companies are not restricted by a “comply or explain” prescript. As a result, awareness and 
compliance with the Code is not as widespread as would be preferred. The companies‟ use of 
sub-committees of the Board of Commissioners is also a matter open for improvement, 
specifically the implementation of audit- and remuneration committees. Several companies 
have complied with this, but many are still lagging behind. 
Since the last assessment in 2004, Indonesia has made the most noticeable improvements in 
the area of shareholder rights. In the process of assessing compliance with the OECD 
principles, the report concluded with the following observations; From the 65 principles to be 
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observed, four principles were fully observed, 25 were broadly observed, 34 principles were 
partially observed, and two were not observed. Indonesia still has a lot of work to be done 
compared to other countries in the region; India, Thailand and Malaysia in particular.  
The report has made some suggestions for steps to be taken to further improve 
implementation of corporate governance, quoted from the ROSC Indonesia country 
assessment (World Bank, 2010):  
- Better regulation of ownership disclosure and other nonfinancial disclosure; 
- Requiring key shareholder rights to be incorporated into company articles; 
- Making more effective use of independent commissioners and audit committees; 
- Amending company law to better protect shareholders; 
- Incorporating and expanding board member powers in company law and the CGCG; 
- Requiring that companies disclose their compliance with CGCG 
- Giving minority shareholders a greater say on board selection; 
- Increasing Bapepam-LK‟s capability to oversee company disclosure and other key 
areas; 
- Encouraging board and media training. 
2.1.4.3 Board Practices 
Our focus is on the determinants of CEO compensation, and by referring to the chapter on 
Corporate Governance and the CEO, we wish in this chapter to put a light on the corporate 
governance landscape of Indonesia and what norm of conduct applies when it comes to board 
structure, independence and CEO influence.  
Earlier, we discussed the difference between unitary- and dual board structure. Indonesian 
companies practice a dual-board structure; the Board of Commissioners (BOC) as the 
supervisory board, and the Board of Directors (BOD) as the management board (Scott, 1999). 
As stressed in our chapter on stakeholders, the Board of Directors is not to be confused with 
the definition of a supervisory board. We have to admonish that the Board of Directors in this 
chapter refers to the management of the company, and rather the Board of Commissioners 
should be seen as the equivalent of the Anglo-American unitary-board structure definition of a 
supervisory board. The President Director of the BOD is, as stated, the equivalent of the CEO. 
As mentioned, the governance structure of Indonesian companies differs slightly from that 
presented before. This comes to light in the election process of commissioners and directors. 
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Referring to the description of a dual-board structure above, it is common practice for the 
supervisory board, in this case the BOC, to elect and choose the members of the management 
board. In the case of Indonesia, all members of the BOC and BOD are chosen directly by 
shareholders at the general meeting of shareholders (GMS), this means that the 
responsibilities of electing members for the management board is not up to the BOC, and this 
practice is mandated by law (Company Law, 2007). The BOC may, however, suspend a 
director, but this has to be confirmed by the GMS within 30 days (World Bank, 2010). When 
the responsibility of electing directors is deprived from the BOC, it may limit the 
commissioners‟ oversight of the management and in effect prevent the BOCs ability to hold 
the BOD accountable (World Bank, 2010). It also requires the GMS to hold more technical 
expertise than normally and to elect top managers best fitted for the job.   
Previously, the commissioners were not considered to be fiduciaries or have an obligation to 
act in the best interest of the company‟s shareholders (Scott, 1999), but this changed due to 
the implementation of the Company Law. According to the law; “Board members are to act in 
the interest of the shareholders, in a reasonable manner, and with good faith and prudence” 
(World Bank, 2010). Board members can be held liable for losses occurred as a result of not 
complying with these duties.    
The Company Law (40/2007) makes it mandatory for every company to have a two-tier board 
structure, in order to make a clear distinction between ownership and control: the Board of 
Directors in charge of management on the one hand, and on the other hand Board of 
Commissioners in charge of supervision of the managements running of the company 
(Tumbuan, 2005). The ROSC on Indonesia (World Bank, 2010) further acknowledge that the 
two-tier board structure ensures that all commissioners are non-executives, but that they may 
still be major shareholders or have connections to help them control and monitor the 
management and the shareholders. The listing rules of IDX require the BOC to consist of at 
least 30 percent independent commissioners (IDX, 2004). Most companies comply with this 
regulation, but very few exceed the 30 percent rule. Further, the listing requirements states 
that in relation to the implementation of good corporate governance, all public companies are 
required to have an audit committee chaired by an independent commissioner and a corporate 
secretary (IDX, 2004). Remuneration- and Nomination committees are not demanded by the 
regulation to the same extent, but companies are encouraged to implement them. The 
corporate secretary should be a director of the relevant listed company (IDX, 2004), and his 
duties include staying informed on capital market regulations, provide information to the 
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public, make recommendations to the BOD concerning the Capital Market and its 
implementing regulations, and act as contact person for the company (Bapepam LK, 1996). 
The regulations mentioned above should lay a solid foundation for the fair and prudent 
exercise of CEO remuneration, with requirements regarding independence of the board, 
separation of ownership and control, and focus on further improvement of corporate 
governance practices. But as the results from the ROSC show, there are still a lot of 
improvements to be made.    
2.2 Economic Theories 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
2.2.1.1 Agency Relationship 
The theory of agency and its precursors of inspiration stem from many years ago. Smith 
(1776) claimed that a director of a joint-stock company will not administer the money of other 
people as carefully as if they were his own. This relates to the problems of the separation of 
ownership and control, later explained in the work and research done by Berle and Means 
(1932). In their research on corporations, they describe the executives as agents and the 
shareholders as principals. The Principal-Agent framework has later been strongly influenced 
and developed by for instance Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), and 
later followed by e.g. Eisenhardt (1989). The agency theory can be described as cooperating 
parties having different goals and positions within the corporation. This often relates to the 
problems of risk-sharing that occurs when the parties have different perceptions of risk 
(Wilson, 1968). A standard way of referring to the agency relationship is when two (or more) 
parties, one appointed as agent, acts on behalf or as a representative for another part, the 
principal (Ross, 1973). This means that the principal wants the agent to perform some kind of 
service on his behalf, which then will involve the delegation of power from the principal to 
the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In regard to this thesis we think of the CEO as the agent, and shareholders and the supervisory 
board as the principals. Notably, the board of commissioners and board of directors in 
Indonesian listed companies are elected by the stockholders at the general annual meeting of 
shareholders. We will first present central and general discussions on agency theory, and 
finally present some unique characteristics on emerging markets in an agency theory 
perspective.  
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2.2.1.2  Agency Problem 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the corporation is a nexus of written and unwritten 
contracts, between owners, workers, and customers. These contracts will specify the rights 
that each agent has in the organization, the evaluation of their performance, and the different 
payoff functions the agents will face (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The specifications of individual 
rights through contracts (explicit and implicit) determine how both costs and rewards will be 
allocated between the participants in any organization. This means that the behavior of the 
executives within the corporation will depend on the specified contracts between the owner 
(principal) and the executive (agent) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Contracts between two or 
more parts are not unproblematic. In fact, Jensen & Meckling (1976) state that:  
Agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring 
of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear cut principal-agent 
relationship (p. 309).  
This supports the theory that agency problems arise because contracts are not costless written 
and enforced. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests. Agency costs also include the value of 
output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). 
2.2.1.2.1 Risk 
There have been done several studies by economists in the field of risk and risk sharing 
among two or more people (Arrow, 1971; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Wilson, 1968). In agency 
theory we also include the agency problem that happens when the principal and agent have 
different goals and perceptions of risk. You may say that a person is said to be risk averse if 
he always prefers an outcome with certainty to a lottery that has the same expected value, and 
this may cause some serious problems with the agency relationships (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992). According to Eisenhardt (1989), an agent problem that occurs is when it becomes 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify the actual actions made by the agent involved. 
This relates to the risk sharing problem that happens when the agent and the principal have 
different approaches to risk. The main problem is that different risk preferences may lead to 
different actions between the agent and the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The situation which can most easily be identified with our problems regarding CEO 
compensation may be the concept of executives and shareholders. Here the shareholder 
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(principal) enjoys the outcome or output produced by the effort (actions) of the chief 
executive officer (agent), together with a random element. Followed by this action the 
principal pays the agent a fee. It is most common that the agent is risk neutral, meaning that 
his fee should equal the outcome minus a constant, being the share that the principal is given. 
The principal (shareholders) is assumed to be risk averse, willing to pay a fee to allocate the 
risk in a desirable way, and using another principal (supervisory board) to monitor the actions 
of the agent (CEO). The idea is to give the right incentives to the agent, avoiding asymmetric 
information and moral hazard (Shavell, 1979) that leads to increased agency costs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), terms that will be discussed more deeply in the next subchapter.  
2.2.1.3 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard can be described as a lack of effort on the part of the agent, meaning that future 
actions agreed upon when writing the contract may not be fully made by the agent. In other 
words, you may say that the agent is shirking some tasks that he should have done according 
to the written contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is post contractual opportunism that arises 
because actions are not freely observable, so the person taking them (the CEO) may choose to 
pursue his private interest at others‟ (the shareholders and supervisory board) expense.  
The difficulty or cost of monitoring and enforcing appropriate behavior creates the moral 
hazard problems, and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) presents conditions for a moral hazard 
problem to exist:  
1) There must be an agency relationship between the individuals in the transaction; 
2) There must be asymmetric information regarding the transaction (monitoring is costly 
or impossible); 
3) The individuals in the transaction have different utility functions. 
Adverse selection is simply that the agent may claim having certain abilities or skills during 
the hiring process, which can be hard to verify for the principal also after the agent is hired 
and starts working (Eisenhardt, 1989). This can be exemplified by an agent (CEO) specialized 
in chemical engineering getting hired by the principal (shareholders) with no real knowledge 
about this topic.  
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2.2.1.3.1 Agency Costs 
It is assumed that both parties will try to maximize their own utility. This indicates that the 
agent often will act in his best own self-interest, and not in the interest of the principal. This 
imbalance will create some costs; Jensen & Meckling (1976) define these agency costs as: 
1) Residual Loss; 
2) Costs occurred for the principal through monitoring; 
3) Bonding expenditures created by employing the agent. 
To try and minimize the divergence from his interest, the principal may initiate appropriate 
incentives for the agent. These should be value-increasing incentives such as performance 
based bonuses, salary revisions, stock options, and performance based dismissal decisions 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The principal can also incur monitoring costs that should be 
designed for to some extent prevent the agent from deriving from the interest of the principal 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Finally, Eisenhardt (1989) claims that the unobservable behavior 
(related to moral hazard and adverse selection), can be dealt with by the principal in two 
possible ways.  First, you may discover the behavior of the CEO by monitoring his actions 
through information systems. These systems may include budgeting systems, reporting 
procedures, board of directors, and additional management layers. However, such monitoring 
always has a cost. Jensen & Meckling (1976) explained that neither the principal nor the agent 
can ensure that the agent is going to make an optimal decision in the best interest of the 
principal at zero cost.  Secondly, the principal has the opportunity to contract the outcome of 
the agent‟s behavior. 
Interesting for our thesis, we can search for a link between firm performance and 
remuneration given to the CEO in Indonesian listed companies. This may help us discover if 
there is a well-functioning incentive system implemented within these firms.   
2.2.1.4 Emerging Markets in an Agency Theory Perspective 
While the general agency theory presented so far can be applied to most markets, Cho (1999) 
explains that the context of weak corporate governance in emerging markets creates a unique 
relation to agency theory. These sets of agency problems involve concerns related to a unique 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Cho, 1999), as well as intensified traditional 
principal-agent problems such as entrenchment and perquisite consumption (Dharwadkar, 
George, & Brandes, 2000).   
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Expropriation happens when there exist weak corporate governance within a firm, and a large 
or major shareholder assumes control of the company and deprives the minority owners‟ right 
to gain appropriate returns on their investments (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Agency 
theory on expropriation in emerging markets is further supported by the ROSC report on 
Indonesia, suggesting that minor shareholders should gain a greater saying on important 
issues relevant to the stock performance (World Bank, 2010). Entrenchment refers to actions 
of the CEO that reduce the degree of control mechanisms made to regulate the management 
behavior. Perquisite consumption refer to short-term costs that occur when the CEO perform 
activities designed to enhance no salary income (perquisites) or other on-the-job consumption 
(Dharwadkar, et al., 2000). 
Agency theorists argue that with change of ownership, the new owners should be aware of 
managerial perquisite consumption and problems related to entrenchment (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency issues related to privatization in emerging 
market occur when ownership is transferred from the government to the new owners while 
creating the previously mentioned problems (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000). In an Indonesian 
context it can be interesting to investigate whether these problems affect the firms and the 
remuneration given to the CEO, and whether there is a difference in government owned and 
non-government owned firms. 
2.2.2 Human Capital Theory 
To increase profits in the long run, and to produce results more effectively, studies have 
shown that investments in human assets and the development of these, is a prerequisite for 
growth and competitiveness in the market. Human assets, in a perspective of competitiveness, 
are hard to imitate due to scarcity, specialization, and tacit knowledge (Coff, 1997). Hence, 
human capital theory refers to the concept of the inherent skills of workers, and how these 
skills can be utilized to the benefit of the company (Becker, 1993). Human capital is, simply 
stated, another phrase for resources in the form of people (Becker, 1962).   
According to this theory, the amount of human capital a worker possesses influences his 
productivity, which in turn influences his earnings (Becker, 1993). Agarwal (1981) argues 
that the same reasoning should apply for executives as well; an executive with greater amount 
of human-capital would be better able to perform his job, and thus be paid more.  
Education and training are the most important investments in human capital (Becker, 1993), 
including schooling, on-the-job-training, medical care, and acquiring information about the 
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firms systems. Becker (1962) argues that there is a close relationship between earnings and 
the amount of human capital invested. According to human capital theory, it is a logical 
assumption to make that the more able an executive is, the more he gets paid. When exploring 
the determinants of CEO pay, we will take this assumption in to consideration. The level of 
education, and the years of experience of the CEO will, according to human capital theory, 
have a positive impact on the total remuneration package. Contradictive to this idea, the CEO 
base-pay is more related to a “competitive pay” view, than that of the executives past 
experience and education, while bonus-arrangements is more a result of the company‟s 
performance and not directly related to the human capital investments in the CEO (Kim, et al., 
2010c).  
The theory of human capital distinguishes between three different types of skills an executive 
possesses. They form a three-skills classification hierarchy presented by Becker (1993) , 
which is based on the degree of specificity to the skills of the organization in which the 
executive works (Harris & Helfat, 1997) ; (1) Generic skills, (2) Industry specific skills, and 
(3) Firm specific skills. Generic skills are transferable across industries, businesses or firms. 
These skills are inherent of any executive and can be transferred and utilized by any business 
or firm, across industries (Harris & Helfat, 1997). The nature and extent of these skills may 
vary between executives. Examples of generic skills are level of education, communicative 
capabilities, social capabilities, and similar. Industry specific skills are directly related to the 
industry in which the executive operates. These skills are obtained through training and 
experience within one type of industry and are not transferable across industries. For example 
an executive with experience in the oil and gas industry will have certain qualifications that 
are not transferable to real-estate, simply because he does not have the prerequisites for this 
industry as he had in the oil and gas industry. The last one, firm specific skills, are skills 
directly related to one particular firm and cannot be utilized in any other firm or business 
(Harris & Helfat, 1997). These skills may relate to the particular firms accounting systems, 
idiosyncrasies of the particular firms machines, special firm terminology, decision procedures 
particular for the firm, and the needs of the firms customers (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
While all aspects of an executives human capital to some degree are equally important, 
Becker (1962) emphasizes on-the-job training as one of the prominent issues in human capital 
investment. On-the-job training is a process that raises future productivity and differs from 
school training in that an investment is made on the job, rather than an institution that 
specializes in teaching (Becker, 1962). On-the-job training is a way for the company to invest 
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in firm-specific skills in the CEO, which will prevent potential agency problems and threat of 
turnover due to interchangeable human capital qualities across firms and industries (Coff, 
1997). When investing in firm-specific skills, the company will create an incentive for the 
CEO to stay in the company, and they can compensate him less than if he was more 
competitive with greater generic or industry-specific skills (Murphy & Zábojník, 2004), 
because firm-specific skills will not represent an attraction for any other employer, hence the 
CEO will be less competitive and desirable in the market. 
In general, human capital theory promotes the inference that the compensation of any 
employee or executive is based on their capabilities and skills. Well-developed generic skills 
imply greater compensation as the executive becomes more attractive in the market, while 
industry- and firm-specific skills are limited by their specificity, and will reduce CEO 
attractiveness. With this reasoning and according to human capital theory, the level of 
education and work experience would be a significant factor when determining the 
compensation of the CEO.  
2.2.3 Managerial Power 
During the first decades of the last century, Berle and Means (1932) introduced the concept of 
managerialism. The idea behind this concept was that a factory system, stemming from the 
industrial revolution would bring a large number of employees under the power of a single 
management. Combining this with the Modern Corporation; described as placing the wealth 
of individuals under a common central management, we get a separation between ownership 
and control. They presented a quasi-public corporation; which is a corporation consisting of 
multiple owners, giving a large measure of separation that takes place amongst ownership and 
control. 
2.2.3.1 Managerial Power Theory 
The skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, 
and the stupid man – Sun Tzu (512 BC) 
Following the introduction of managerialism, came the development of managerial power 
theory.  Finkelstein (1992) defines managerial power as the ability to influence others, and in 
relation to both the uncertainty and ambiguity related to strategic issues of the corporation, 
this power is extra important. Murphy (2002) explains that the view of managerial power puts 
emphasis on incumbent exercise power and influence of the executives, held over outside 
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directors that are somehow connected to the executives in charge. These connecting bonds 
may be interest, collegiality, or affinity.                            
Relationships between the chief executive director and the organization and composition of 
the boards will also affect the power of the CEO. Board composition related to the number of 
dependent / independent directors, as well as the number of directors whom the CEO holds 
some degree of influence, are also critical factors regulating the CEO power. Classified 
boards therefore raise the amount of power held by the CEO, and decrease the possibility of 
hostile takeovers (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002). 
2.2.3.2 Managerial Discretion 
Managerial discretion was introduced by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), and is a theory 
explaining how executive officers are able to affect organizational outcomes. According to 
them, the outcomes of an organization related to the actions of executive directors, are a 
function of the characteristics of management, the environment tasks, and the internal 
organization. They also report that the relation between top management tenure and both 
continuity of strategy and firm performance, is being moderated by managerial discretion 
(Carpenter & Golden, 1997). 
Pfeffer (1992) assert that a manager (or CEO) must be perceived as powerful by others in 
order to influence others. Carpenter and Golden (1997) further comments on this, explaining 
the significance of Pfeffer‟s statement by emphasizing that it separates managerial power 
from perceived managerial discretion, both practically and theoretically. Even if a CEO 
perceives himself as powerful and having much discretion, they will not be powerful unless 
others actually recognize them as being powerful. Carpenter and Golden (1997) therefore 
conclude that perceived discretion can predict managerial power, but only when the manager 
has little discretion. 
2.2.3.3 CEO Remuneration in Light of Managerial Power 
Clearly, CEOs (like most others) prefer more, rather than less remuneration. The question is 
rather if a CEO and other executive directors have the opportunity to directly influence the 
structure and level of their granted compensation (Murphy, 2002).               
Related to the remuneration of executives, an optimal contracting practice supported by the 
research of many academics, would be a pay arrangement set by the board of directors with 
the goal of optimizing shareholder value. This is with an arm‟s length relationship, meaning 
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that directors are not able to influence their own compensation. Managerial power theory has 
a different approach and neglects the arm‟s length relationship assumption. In fact, it claims 
that executive officers have the power and ability to influence their own remuneration, and by 
the use of this power they can also extract rents. The managerial power approach concludes 
that the greater the power of the CEO, the higher the amount of rents will tend to be 
(Bebchuk, et al., 2002). Murphy (2002) disagrees with this view and presents in his study 
evidence that CEOs hired from the outside with no connections to the boards of the firm 
actually receive especially attractive pay packages.                    
Managerial power held by the CEO will greatly depend on the ownership structure of the 
corporation. The more shares held by the CEO, the greater the influence on the election of 
directors and stronger the ability to resist hostile takeovers. This means that the power of the 
CEO will decrease as the number of shares owned by outside stockholders increases, and as 
already mentioned, increase with the percentage of shares owned by him (Bebchuk, et al., 
2002).                                                                                                                                                           
We can put a closer emphasis on ownership structure by looking at stock options granted to 
the CEO. Murphy (2002) explains that CEOs working in the United States of America, 
receive a substantially higher pay level than CEOs in other nations. This hypothesis held even 
after controlling for industry, size, and other managerial and environmental characteristics. 
Murphy also proposes that this variance in CEO remuneration amongst the different countries, 
stem from the higher utilization of stock options in the U.S., an assertion that we also find 
interesting in relation to CEO compensation in Indonesia. 
In Morck (2000) we are presented that corporations under the control of large shareholders or 
families, often choose to install themselves as executive directors rather than hiring 
professional managers. Furthermore he explains that the CEOs of such companies may 
actually have a greater power than CEOs in the U.S.  This power can help the executive 
directors extracting rents through their CEO remuneration. Family- and CEO ownership is 
also an element of our data analysis, and we hope to discover if it also affects remuneration in 
some of the Indonesian stock listed companies. 
2.2.4 Theory of Firm 
Early firm theory and why a firm emerges was presented by Ronald Coase (1937). He 
claimed that the main reason for firms to be established would be because it is profitable due 
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to the cost of using the price mechanism. In short, he explains that by having a production 
organized through the price mechanism, a cost will occur as we discover the relevant prices 
involved. This is because the thought of all relevant prices being known to all individuals, 
does not hold in the real world. Additionally Coase explains that contracts are greatly reduced 
when there is a firm existing, as the series of contracts is substituted one (Coase, 1937). 
The theory of firm was extended by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Michael Jensen and 
William Meckling (1976) who in short describes the firm as a set of contracts among different 
production factors. We know that Coase (1937) claimed that the effect on contracts was given 
by the market, and that activities also related to exchanges would be kept within the firm in 
situations where the costs related to using the market exceeded the costs of authority. Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) disagree with this view and emphasize the role of contracts as the driving 
factor for optional exchanges, as well as underlining the importance of monitoring in 
situations with joint input or team production
10
 in the firm. 
As we described in our chapter regarding agency theory, individuals usually act in their own 
self-interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) elaborate this view, and explain that the firm can be 
seen as a team of individuals realizing that their outcomes to some extent depend on the 
achievements of the group, compared to teams that can be seen as competitors.                                                                          
In one of his articles, Fama (1980) claims that the view presented above is not carried far 
enough. He explains the separation of security ownership and control by using a set of 
contracts, making it an efficient economic organization. Fama (1980) treats management and 
risk bearing attributed to an entrepreneur in a large modern corporation, as two naturally 
different factors. These factors are being separated by a set of contracts known as the firm. 
Following already established firm and organizational theory around separation of ownership 
and control (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Fama and Jensen 
(1983) defines an organization as:  
…the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production 
and customers. These contracts or internal "rules of the game" specify the rights of each 
                                                          
10
 They define the classical capitalist firm as a contractual organization of inputs in which there is „(a) joint 
input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, 
(d) who has rights to renegotiate any input‟s contractual residual status, (e) who holds the residual claim, and 
(f) who has the right to sell his contractual residual status  -  Alchian and Demsetz (1972) as sited by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
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agent in the organization, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated, and the 
payoff functions they face (p. 302). 
2.2.4.1 Stock Ownerships in Firms 
To achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve 
superior results is harder than it looks – Benjamin Graham (1973) 
Berle and Means (1932) stated that the most common conditions that we see in large 
companies, is that the largest stockholder is a second corporation that itself also is widely 
owned. We have already introduced the modern corporation, and explained the concept 
behind the separation of ownership and control, as explained by Berle and Means. Monsen 
and Downs (1965) later backed up this research by restating that in the most significant and 
largest modern firms, management and ownership are tasks handled by two totally different 
groups of people.   
  
 
46 
3 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
3.1 Previous Empirical Research on CEO Compensation  
Empirical research on CEO remuneration has been developed and influenced under various 
theories from multiple disciplines. Scholars from finance, accounting, economics, 
management, law, and organizational behavior have all contributed to the academic research 
on this topic. Also, as we more deeply discussed under our different theories, these academics 
may have different views and approaches while the basic assumptions and conclusions 
usually are related or homogenous.            
Studying the recent corporate governance reforms, we have added yet another view to the 
theory of CEO pay. Emphasizing more on the top pay debate, where governments and others 
regard pay inequalities as a wider indifference in the society, researchers have started looking 
more at the transparency of processes regarding decisions of CEO pay and the amount of this 
remuneration. Finally, there is an increasing pressure from shareholders and institutions, 
requesting more control over both remuneration committees and directors (Tyson, 2005), 
supporting the idea of maximized shareholder value.  
For a deeper understanding of our chosen topic, we will present some previous studies 
conducted on CEO pay, both in a local (Indonesian) and international context. While our local 
findings are limited, we will provide various international contributions in order to see 
examples of which determinants and sample sizes have been used.  
Starting with previous research conducted on CEO pay in Indonesia, our search offered only 
limited results. As stated in our Corporate Governance in Indonesia chapter; even though 
most listed companies on IDX disclose their total BOD and BOC compensation, only two 
percent of the firms reveal individual remuneration. Adding that only five percent of the listed 
companies disclose their remuneration policy, we believe that this report explains the lack of 
previous research on CEO remuneration in Indonesia. 
Supporting the results from the above mentioned report (ROSC on Indonesia), Murphy, 
Fernandes, Ferreira, and Matos (2009) in their study  on why American top executives are 
paid more than their foreign counterparts, due to too few observations, chose to leave out 21 
countries and amongst them Indonesia.   
Keeping focus on emerging markets, Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) made a paper examining the 
corporate performance and CEO remuneration in China. Looking at annual reports data from 
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549 Chinese listed companies over a three year period from 1998-2000, they conduct their 
statistical analysis. Consistent with research in other countries, size is positively and 
significantly related to CEO remuneration. Further, they conclude there is a positive 
correlation between CEO pay and firm performance both measured in shareholder wealth and 
accounting terms (though only statistically significant under special ownership conditions). 
Finally, they find that firms having the state as major shareholder do not tend to have 
performance related pay. The opposite can be found in privately held companies, were CEO 
remuneration goes up as stockholder wealth or firm profitability increases (Firth, et al., 2006). 
Cheng and Firth (2006) made a study on CEO remuneration, corporate governance, and 
family ownership in Hong Kong. They used remuneration data from 336 firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of HK over a nine year period (1994-2002), excluding foreign and Chinese 
firms, banks, and investment funds. Their findings suggested that CEO remuneration is 
reduced if directors have substantial shareholdings.  Secondly, they find that pay is positively 
related to profits but not to stock returns. These findings support the theory that outside 
shareholders and independent non-executive directors prefer firms to base CEO pay on the 
profitability of the firm (Suwina Cheng & Firth, 2006). 
In a European study, Randøy and Nielsen (2002) looked at how company performance and 
corporate governance affects CEO remuneration in two Scandinavian countries; Sweden and 
Norway. They explain that Scandinavian countries have a political economy characterized by 
economic transparency (in both listed companies and governments), and that their corporate 
governance is moving closer to the Anglo-American system. In their research they used a 
sample of 224 traded companies (120 Norwegian and 104 Swedish firms) over a three year 
period from 1996-1998. Their empirical statistical evidence provides significant positive 
relationships between CEO compensation and; board size, foreign board membership, and 
market capitalization, respectively. In addition, there was a significant negative relationship 
between CEO ownership and CEO remuneration. Finally, no significant relationship was 
found between CEO tenure and CEO compensation (except for Norwegian firms when a 
change in market-to-book performance measure was used) or company performance and CEO 
remuneration (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002).  
In an Anglo-American context, Conyon and Peck (1998) used a sample of 94 UK listed 
companies assessing the empirical relationship between remuneration, top management pay, 
board of directors, and remuneration committees. Main measures used in this study were 
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compensation, board- and remuneration committees, and CEO duality, while using 
nominating committees, board size, firm performance, company size, and off-board 
shareholdings as controlling variables. Their findings suggested that boardroom control and 
variables of vigilance had little effect on CEO compensation. They also concluded that CEO 
duality had a negative correlation with management remuneration. Finally they explain that 
companies that have adopted remuneration committees or with a high level of unrelated 
members generally have a higher level of executive remuneration (Conyon & Peck, 1998). 
In a similar study on board control and CEO pay, Boyd (1994) used a sample of 193 publicly 
held U.S. companies with annual data from 1980. Identifying board of directors as a key 
internal control mechanism for deciding the CEO pay, he claimed using theory that the CEO 
will attempt to gain board control in an effort to maximize his own remuneration. Using 
corporate governance literature, findings further suggested that CEO compensation is greater 
in firms with lower level of control. Perhaps more surprisingly, he found no significant 
relationship to firm size or profitability. His analysis proved board control to have the largest 
effect on remuneration (standardized coefficient of -0.85), firm size the second largest (0.12), 
and the controlling variable profitability as the third (0.08) largest (B. K. Boyd, 1994). 
Hill and Phan (1991) conducted a study on CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay, where 
they looked at the total compensation data of 104 U.S. firms, paid in the period from 1977 till 
1988. Using data from Forbes magazine, they found a positive relationship between CEO pay 
and stock returns. This relationship will be weaker the longer the tenure of the CEO 
(significant and negative coefficient for this variable, p<.01), with the dependent variable 
being the change in CEO compensation. They also hypothesized a positive correlation 
between CEO pay and firm size - the longer the tenure of the CEO. They got an interaction 
term (size by tenure) being significant (p<.001) and positive, supporting their hypothesis. 
Their results also suggested that a long CEO tenure helps the CEO build influence, increasing 
the positive relationship between pay and firm risk, while the correlation between pay and 
stock returns weakens (Hill & Phan, 1991). 
Finally, we present a study on worldwide structure and level of CEO compensation. As 
mentioned in this chapter, Fernandes et al. (2009) looked at the structure and level of CEO 
compensation in 27 countries, using recent data from newly developed rules on disclosure and 
transparency. They conclude that CEOs in the U.S. earn more than their foreign counterparts, 
and that difference in firm, industry, intensive use of incentive compensation, and governance 
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characteristics can explain the US pay premium.  Finally, they prove that after seeing a sharp 
reduction in pay premium from 2000 till 2006, worldwide CEO pay is converging to U.S. 
levels.  
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
Firm size, corporate governance, and firm performance are among the main determinants of 
CEO remuneration, explained in our previous chapters. In addition to these determinants we 
also include special determinants more or less unique in an Indonesian context. 
As mentioned, Chinese business conglomerates control as much as 70% of the Indonesian 
economy, and these conglomerates are often owned by powerful families (Chua, 2008). 
Former president Soeharto was associated with many of these groups, indicating close 
relationships between government and families. The Soeharto family was considered a major 
financial force in Indonesia, owning various domestic firms themselves (Fisman, 2000).  
Privatization of state-owned enterprises increased in Indonesia when the new Investment Law 
was implemented in 2007, making it easier for the Indonesian Government to facilitate the 
measures needed to privatize. Tambunan (2011) claims that the Indonesian Government has 
acknowledged that private investment, including IFDI, is crucial for the modernization of the 
Indonesian economy and to achieve sustainable economic growth. He explains one of the 
measures initiated by the government to give better conditions for privatized companies, is by 
developing an overall policy meant to accelerate the development of infrastructure, logistics, 
law enforcement, security, and human resource development (Tambunan, 2011). Combined 
with the agency problems of entrenchment and managerial perquisite consumption related to 
transfer of ownership from the government to new owners and the issues mentioned above, 
we are inclined to suggest that privatized Indonesian firms may perform worse than 
government owned firms. 
Based on discussed theory and previous empirical results, we are ready to formulate our 
research hypotheses: 
Looking at firm size in relation with CEO compensation, there have been conflicting findings. 
Boyd (1994) found no significant relation between firm size and CEO compensation. Firth, 
Feng and Rui (2006), on the other hand, concludes in their research on 549 Chinese 
companies, that there exist a positive relationship between the size of the company and the 
remuneration package offered to the CEO. With historic ties, geographical connection, and 
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strong Chinese ownership in Indonesia, we argue for a similarity in pay structure in firms 
within these two nations. Other studies also prove a positive relationship between firm size 
and CEO compensation (Cosh, 1975; Kostiuk, 1990), hence we formulate Hypothesis 1 as 
follows:  
H1: There is a positive relation between firm size and CEO compensation 
As with firm size, there have also been contradictory findings in the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Attaway (2000) find a 
significant and positive relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, 
although not proving a very strong relationship. Firth, Feng and Rui (2006) and Cheng and 
Firth (2006) are also able to identify a relationship in their study on China, though only 
significant under certain ownership conditions. Randøy and Nielsen (2002), in company with 
studies by Firth et.al (1995), Miller (1995) and Boyd (1994), did not succeed in finding any 
significant relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. All these studies, 
except Firth, et al (2006) and Cheng and Firth (2006), are conducted in western markets. Due 
to lack of previous research on Indonesia, we argue for the existence of a positive relationship 
with coverage in agency theory, proposing an incentive effect related to firm performance. 
This implies that the greater the performance of the company, the greater the compensation of 
the CEO. Our second hypothesis reads as follows: 
H2: There is a positive relation between firm performance and CEO compensation 
Further, we wish to explore if there exists a relationship between family owned firms and 
CEO compensation. Randøy and Goel  (2003) argues that family ownership in Norwegian 
companies gives incentives for moderate pay and long-term perspectives, which infers a 
negative effect on CEO compensation. In a study on determinants of CEO compensation in 
India, Ramaswamy, et al, (2000) confirm that a high proportion of family ownership is 
negatively related to CEO compensation. Contrary to this, Barontini and Bozzi (2009), find in 
their recent working-paper on Italian-listed companies, that family firms pay CEOs 
systematically more than other firms. Results of research are contradictory in this case as 
well. In our chapter on the history of Indonesian economy, Chua (2008) explains that the big 
Chinese families survived the fall of the New Order, making them a strong force to be 
reckoned also today. These long-term ownerships may indicate the long-term perspective and 
moderate pay as presented in Randøy and Goel (2003). According to this, we suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
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H3: There is a negative relation between family owned firms and CEO compensation 
Looking more closely at the effects of ownership structure in Indonesia, the government is the 
largest shareholder in many listed firms on the IDX, and in effect the owner of these 
companies. Firth, et al, (2006) provides evidence for a negative relation between state-
ownership and CEO compensation in China. In contradiction to this, and in line with our 
agency theory on emerging markets, Dharwadkar, et al., (2000) proposed that several 
privatized firms in emerging economies are ineffective and have a weak governance system, 
leading to a weak financial performance. Further they explain that emerging economies 
recently have introduced measures to privatize their government-owned companies, intending 
to replicate the success of models in developed markets. As mentioned in our Theory chapter, 
transfer of ownership from government to the new owners will create agency problems. This 
may indicate that government owned firms in emerging markets perform better than 
privatized firms and have a better developed corporate governance system. Since we already 
suggest a positive relation between firm performance and CEO compensation, our fourth 
hypothesis states that: 
H4: There is a positive relation between government ownership and CEO compensation 
According to previous research, there exist a positive relation between board size and CEO 
compensation. Looking back at the suggested steps on how to improve corporate governance 
in the different corporate governance codes, the idea of having a small effective board is 
strongly recommended. A small board will not suffer from the same monitoring and 
communication problems as that of a large board - where the CEO will have greater influence 
on the board. Core, et al, (1999) and Randøy and Nielsen (2002) both find a positive 
association between board size and CEO compensation. Based on this previous research, and 
theory of corporate governance, our fifth hypothesis states: 
H5: There is a positive relation between board size and CEO compensation 
The subject of including independent non-executive directors in the ranks of the supervising 
board is widely covered in theory and regulations of Corporate Governance. The purpose of 
implementing independent directors is to reduce cronyism, develop fairness and protection of 
shareholder rights, and in effect have an impact on CEO remuneration. Independent board 
members are required not to have any relations with the top management, to better be able to 
make objective decisions related to the well-being of the company. CEO influence on the 
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board will decrease, and his ability to affect his own compensation diminishes; effectively 
leading to a negative relationship between the ratio of independent board members and CEO 
compensation. Hence, our final hypothesis is formulated accordingly:  
H6: There is a negative relation between the ratio of independent board members and CEO 
compensation 
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4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data Collection and Sampling Procedure 
The sample used for our data analysis is drawn from the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) as 
this is the common practice in corporate governance research. Conducting our empirical 
study, we have chosen a sample of Indonesian stock listed companies, using annual reports 
from 2007, 2008, and 2009. The selection criterion for our sample was the existence of 
useable financial performance, compensation, size, and governance data. As of December 
2010 there were 415 listed companies on IDX (our population) from which we derived our 
sample after a series of exclusions and minor problems. These reports were obtained from the 
IDX website or respective company websites if not found in IDX. Our first time-consuming 
data collection resulted in the following statistics: 
Annual Report Coverage 
(Period) 
Count Percentage 
5 years 63 15.18% 
3-4 years 133 32.05% 
1-2 years 79 19.04% 
< 1 year 131 31.57% 
Only financial statements 9 2.17% 
Total 415 100% 
Table 4-1: Preliminary results from data collection 
The above results led to the exclusion of 218 listed companies, as they did not provide annual 
reports for the three years of our study. Having a preliminary sample of 196 (47.23 %) listed 
companies, we further excluded all banks, Sharia banks, and insurance companies (31+11), as 
they have different law regulations and corporate governance policies than our remaining 
companies, involving both the composition of boards and rules on foreign acquisitions.  
With an initial goal of analyzing all companies less banks and insurance, we divided the 
remaining 154 companies in two equal parts, each researcher starting alphabetically from 
ticker AALI and JIHD respectively. Due to time limitations and complications briefly 
described below, from 154 listed companies remaining, our final sample is 46 (30%) 
Indonesian listed companies, while we initially hoped to have at least a 100. Using a sample 
on the basis of judgment, we chose a sample size best suited the time-limitations of our thesis. 
Acknowledging that we are inexperienced researchers, we also looked at previous studies 
conducted by experienced researchers (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2010). We mainly 
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used secondary data from the financial statements and corporate governance policies provided 
in the annual reports of the Indonesian listed companies. Unfortunately, for a number of 
variables in our study, we could not use the secondary sources. In response to this we used e-
mail, LinkedIn, Facebook, and similar to get in contact with the companies in order to obtain 
data on both CEO tenure and age, founding year, and similar. Previous research indicates that 
executive stock option-plans are increasingly popular in Asia (Suwina Cheng & Firth, 2006). 
Sadly, the disclosure and level of details provided by firms proved insufficient for us to derive 
the option values, nor if any option agreements did exist. 
Furthermore, we want to emphasize that our sample provides a rather uneven distribution of 
different industries. As shown in the table below we have e.g. only one firm from agriculture 
while we have as much as eleven from infrastructure, utilities, and transportation. This means 
that our sample will not reflect the true population, and that we should control for industry 
effects when later conducting our analysis. Table 4-2 shows our sample of firms divided into 
their respective industries, compared with the entire IDX population minus banks and 
insurance companies, meant go give a clearer picture of probable differences between our 
sample and the population. 
Industry Classification 
IDX 
Population 
% 
Thesis 
Sample 
% 
1. Agriculture  15 4% 1 2.2% 
2. Mining  29 8% 4 8.7% 
3. Basic Industry  59 17% 3 6.5% 
4. Misc. Ind.  42 12% 2 4.3% 
5. Consumer and 
Manufacture  
34 10% 8 17.4% 
6. Property and Real 
Estate  
47 13% 9 19.6% 
7. Infrastructure, Utilities 
and Transportation  
32 9% 11 23.9% 
8. Trade, Services and 
Investment 
96 
27% 8 17.4% 
Total 354 100% 46 100% 
Table 4-2: Population and sample overview 
In addition, we note that the profitability (ROE) may be different depending on for example 
industry and ownership structure. Again we emphasize that our sample may not necessarily 
reflect the population. Finally, we present a table with the market capitalization for the 
different industries on IDX, and at the same time presenting an average market capitalization 
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for each company belonging to a specific industry. This can be a measurement for firm size, 
and we can see that e.g. the average mining company is substantially larger than the average 
property and real estate firms.  
Industry Classification % Number of shares Market Cap. 
Avg. Market 
Cap 
1. Agriculture (15) 4% 84 927 522 960 94 001 178 6 266 745 
2. Mining (29) 8% 268 156 472 861 473 730 539 16 335 536 
3. Basic Industry (59) 17% 158 247 336 332 222 822 054 3 776 645 
4. Misc. Ind. (42) 12% 55 949 720 120 239 744 789 5 708 209 
5. Consumer and 
Manufacture (34) 
10% 87 161 080 032 441 178 789 12 975 846 
6. Property and Real 
Estate (47) 
13% 296 136 071 709 107 140 786 2 279 591 
7. Infrastructure, 
Utilities and 
Transportation (32) 
9% 303 770 057 921 439 093 095 13 721 659 
8. Trade, Services and 
Investment (96) 
27% 321 275 641 281 256 191 955 2 668 666 
             Total 100% 1 575 623 903 216 2 273 903 185 6 423 455 
Table 4-3: IDX overview 
Seeing time caught up with us, due to issues such as slow firm-websites, reports being in the 
Bahasa Indonesia language (we used Google
TM 
Translate), scanned/illegible/unsearchable, 
and lacking crucial variables to our research, we acknowledge the limitations of our sample 
and would be happy to share our annual reports with anyone interested in further conducting 
empirical studies on CEO compensation in Indonesia.   
4.1.1 The CEO-Pay Extraction Equation11 
When going through the data collected, we discovered major problems in collecting the 
dependent variable - CEO pay. Details concerning the remuneration of the CEO are noted 
under the Corporate Governance chapter in the annual reports or in the notes to the financial 
statements. About 15% of the companies in our sample disclose detailed information of CEO 
remuneration, 15% give aggregated remuneration numbers for BOD
12
 and BOC
13
 
                                                          
11
 Note that in Indonesia, they refer to the CEO as the President Director.  
12
 The Board of Directors (BOD) consists of the CEO and several executive directors. This is the management 
board, in control of day-to-day operations. 
13
 The Board of Commissioners (BOC) consists of the President Commissioner and several dependent and 
independent commissioners. This is the supervisory board, in charge of maintaining shareholder interests and 
monitoring the BOD.  
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respectively, while 70% of the companies disclose the total remuneration paid to both BOD 
and BOC.  
We developed the CEO pay extraction equation to extract the CEO pay from these aggregated 
numbers. Some sample companies, while not disclosing detailed remuneration information, 
disclosed the ratio distribution of the total remuneration as a percentage of the CEOs salary. 
While these ratios differ, we found that the most common ratio distribution were as follows; 
Directors are paid 90% of the CEOs pay, the President Commissioner receives 40% of the 
CEOs pay and each commissioner (both dependent and independent) receive 36% of the 
CEOs pay (or 90% of the President Commissioners pay). When generalizing this relationship, 
we developed the following equation to extract the CEO remuneration: 
                        (      )  (       )  (      ) 
Where   is the CEO pay, (      ) is the amount paid to the directors, (       ) is the 
amount paid to the President Commissioner, and (      ) is the amount paid to the 
commissioners. The equation leaves us with only one unknown;  . We have explained the 
CEO-pay extraction equation in detail in Appendix 3, where we illustrate the proceedings 
used in our data collection.  
4.1.2 Random and Systematic Sampling Errors 
As mentioned, we are aware that our sample may not always provide sufficient and accurate 
results, and that some statistical errors may occur.  
Random sampling errors are functions of the sampling size. This means that if we had 
increased our sample from 30% to 100% of the accessible listed Indonesian companies, the 
random sampling error would decrease to a minimum. Laws of probability assume that the 
smaller the sample size, the larger the possibility of misinterpretations and margins of error 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). An example could be that the average CEO remuneration will have a 
larger probability of error using a smaller sample size. 
Another type of error is the systematic (non-sampling) errors from factors not directly related 
to the sample. These errors often relate to the correctness of execution and nature of the study 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). Sample biases may come from e.g. difference in validity on the 
variables in the annual reports from the Indonesian listed companies, depending on the quality 
of internal and external auditing. 
 
57 
Finally, Zikmund et al. (2010) describes additional errors that may occur when the sample is 
less than perfectly representative. In our case we have chosen to call this a non-reporting error 
which happens when annual reports were not available or incomplete, forcing us to initially 
leave out 218 Indonesian listed companies.  
Carefully considering all errors mentioned above, we realize the danger of using too many, 
and non-significant, or weakly, correlated variables in our multiple regression analysis. We 
will watch closely at the degrees of freedom (df), that Zikmund et al. (2010) describes as the 
number of observations we have minus the number of assumptions we actually need to 
calculate a statistical term.  
4.2 List of Variables 
Below we present our table of variables together with theory to support our analysis. 
Conducting a multiple regression analysis, the number of independent variables should be two 
or more, and the type of measurement for both the dependent and explanatory variables will 
be interval (Zikmund, et al., 2010). 
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DEP = Dependent Variable, IND = Independent Variable, CONTR = Controlling Variable 
Variable Definition Type 
CEO Compensation  
Total CEO 
compensation (log) 
Natural log of Total CEO compensation in IDR DEP 
CEO Characteristics  
CEO tenure (log) Natural log of years as CEO in the Company CONTR 
CEO education          
dummy 
Dummy that equals 1 if CEO has a Masters, MBA, JD or 
PhD degree, and zero otherwise 
CONTR 
Firm Characteristics  
Firm size (log) Natural log of total revenues IND 
Firm performance Average ROE (Return on Equity) IND 
Family firm dummy Dummy that equals 1 if the Company is owned by a 
family, and 0 otherwise 
IND 
Government 
ownership dummy 
Dummy that equals 1 if the Company is owned by the 
Indonesian Government, and 0 otherwise 
IND 
Industry dummy Dummy that equals 1 if the Company belongs to a given 
industry, and 0 otherwise 
CONTR 
Board Characteristics  
Board size 
Number of members in the Board of Commissioners 
(BOC) 
IND 
Board independence 
Ratio of the number of independent board members to 
board size 
IND 
Table 4-4: List of variables 
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4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
CEO remuneration is our dependent variable which we try both to predict and explain by the 
use of other variables, and alone using descriptive tools. Presented theory asserts that CEO 
compensation optimally should consist of a base salary, an annual bonus related to accounting 
performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans. Unfortunately, very few 
Indonesian listed companies disclosed any of those components, and rarely even the total pay 
given to their CEO. This led us to the use of unorthodox measurements, developing our own 
simple mathematical model named the CEO-pay extraction equation. 
Being a continuous variable that can take a range of values while responding to a quantitative 
amount (Zikmund, et al., 2010), we will use the natural logarithm of CEO remuneration as our 
dependent variable, in order to reduce heteroscedasticity. This is a well-known approach that 
has been used by several researchers in the past, amongst them Boyd (1994), Randøy and 
Nielsen (2002), and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy (2009). 
4.2.2 Independent Variable 
Our dependent variable (total CEO pay) will be lagged one year with respect to some of our 
explanatory variables, meaning that these independent variables refer to years 2007 and 2008. 
This approach has previously been used by Kerr and Betis (1987), and in a more recent study 
conducted by Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) - where they explain that the one year lag gives a 
more accurate description of CEO remuneration. They reason for this with the fact that CEO 
pay-levels may not be continuously evaluated (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005), hence our firm 
size variable, corporate governance variables, and CEO characteristics will be with the lag 
mentioned.  
Our first independent or explanatory variable is firm size, which we already discussed in our 
previous research chapter as often being a strong predictor of CEO compensation (Randøy & 
Nielsen, 2002). It can be measured by total assets (Fernandes, et al., 2009), net sales/revenue 
(B. K. Boyd, 1994), or market capitalization (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005).We have chosen to 
measure firm size by using the natural logarithm of revenue, seeing that size alone was 
normally not disclosed.  
Firm financial performance is our next explanatory variable, and we will use an accounting-
based measure given by Return on Equity (ROE), calculated by dividing annual net income 
by the end-of-year equity of shareholders. We will not use the one year lag, but instead the 
average of 2007 and 2008 for total CEO pay 2008, and average ROE of all three years for 
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total CEO compensation in 2009. The reason why we chose to use the average rather than one 
year lag, is because the CEO, as mentioned in Oxelheim and Randøy (2005), is not 
continuously evaluated. In addition, Eaton and Rosen (1983) point out that by using an 
average ROE, we can account for unusual changes during the time period of the study.  
Further, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) presented a significant relationship between bonus 
pay and ROE, supporting our approach of using present year‟s performance and not only 
lagged values.  
To test our hypotheses and enlighten our research problem, explanatory variables related to 
board power and board characteristics are also included in our analysis. Here we use BOC 
size, percentage of independent board members, and two dummies; foreign BOC members 
and international education within the BOC.  
4.2.3 Control Variables 
In our multiple regression analysis we also want to include non-metric independent variables - 
known as dummy variables. These variables use 0 and 1 to code the different levels of two-
group variables, and multiple dummy variables can be used in the regression model 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). We have decided to include three controlling dummy variables in our 
study; with the first two being reporting year and industry. In a similar study, Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2005) also controlled for one-digit industry effects by using 1 for yes and 0 for no. 
Controlling variables related to CEO characteristics include CEO tenure and our final 
controlling dummy variable; education level of the CEO. We are not including CEO duality 
as the dual board structure and corporate governance laws prohibit the executives from being 
in both the BOD and the BOC (which controls the remuneration committee). 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The major purpose of descriptive statistics is to describe characteristics of the sample 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). Descriptive characteristics give an oversight of the data in an 
understandable manner, and are easy to interpret. This approach helps us to see the 
development in CEO remuneration through the three years of which we have collected our 
data sample.  
Common descriptive statistic measurement methods are; illustrations of frequency 
distributions, proportions, and measures of central tendency. When presenting the descriptive 
findings of our sample, we will take advantage of frequency distributions and measures of 
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central tendencies; mean-values and standard deviation. Mean-values are simply put, the 
average of the metric values in a sample, while the standard deviation explains the degree of 
spread in the sample. If the standard deviation deviates much from the mean, it means that 
there is a large spread among the sample values, and opposite if the standard deviation is close 
or equal to the mean, indicating a small spread (Zikmund, et al., 2010). 
4.4 Correlations 
A bivariate correlation is an index explaining how much two variables correlate, and 
represents a standardized measure of covariance (Zikmund, et al., 2010). More specific, 
Wenstøp (2006) explains that when two variables display a correlation of 1.0, they are 
perfectly correlated, meaning they have no unique variance and essentially can be thought of 
as one and the same. When the opposite happens, and two variables are correlated with -1.0, 
they are perfectly negatively correlated (Wenstøp, 2006). The variables are mirror images of 
each other, so if hypothetically CEO age went up, CEO remuneration would go equally down 
if they had a correlation of -1.0. As we show in the figure below, correlation can range 
between -1.0 and 1.0. Correlations near 0 indicate a lack of relationship between two variables 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 4-1: Strength of correlations 
4.5 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Zikmund et al. (2010) describes multiple regression analysis as an extension of the simple 
regression analysis, making us able to predict a metric dependent variable by using multiple 
independent variables. The multiple regression analysis equation can be explained by this 
mathematical model: 
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Y = the dependent variable which will be explained by the independent variables 
X = independent variable (or explanatory variable) expected to influence Y in some way  
α = constant, will equal the mean if slope coefficients are zero  
β = standardized regression coefficient, explains the relationship between Y and X while 
taking into consideration the other X that also affect the dependent variable (partial 
correlation) 
ε = shows the remaining change which cannot be explained by the chosen variables 
Best suiting our variables, and in line with previous research on corporate governance and 
CEO compensation (Core, et al., 1999; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002) we propose the following 
regression model: 
Total CEO Compensationt (log) = α + β1 × ROEmean + β2 × Firm Sizet-1 (log) + β3 × 
Board Sizet-1 + β4 × Board Independencet-1 + β5 × CEO Tenuret-1 + β6 × Government 
Owned Dummies + β7 × Family Firm Dummies + β8 × CEO Education Dummies + βi × 
Industry Dummies 
If we used only a simple regression analysis, the dependent variable (Yi), would have been 
explained by just one independent variable (Xn). In reality it is usually a lot more complicated, 
hence we will conduct our analysis on Y and X by the use of a multiple regression analysis in 
SPSS. Previous studies in line with using this statistical method related to CEO pay include 
e.g. Hill and Phan (1991), Finkelstein and Boyd (1998), Randøy and Nielsen (2002), and 
Fernandes et al. (2009).  
Unfortunately, as already mentioned in this chapter, our relatively small sample has its 
limitations; consequently we may exclude explanatory variables with low correlations in our 
final regression model. 
Our main goal with this thesis is to develop and test a model in order to find and analyze the 
determinants that can help explain CEO remuneration in Indonesia. To interpret the results 
given by our multiple regression analysis, Zikmund et al. (2010) proposes the following four 
steps (p. 588): 
1. Examine the model F-test; 
2. Examine the individual statistical tests for each parameter estimate; 
3. Examine the model R2; 
4. Examine collinearity diagnostics.  
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We will go through these steps, while also further explaining what the statistical values and 
data analysis show us. 
4.5.1 Analysis of Variance 
When you want to test your hypothesis for differences between more than two groups, 
meaning more than two levels of the independent variable, a t-test alone cannot handle this 
problem. ANOVA is an available tool included in the multiple regression analysis in SPSS 
that can be used for this purpose. Wenstøp (2006) explains the most important values given 
by the ANOVA-model; the F-test, leading us to the first step presented by Zikmund et al. 
(2010), saying that if the test result is not significant, the model should be rejected and further 
steps are not needed. 
In ANOVA, the F-test can be used to identify whether there is more variability in the scores 
of one sample compared to the scores of another sample. The key is to find whether two 
sample variances differ from each other or if they are from the same population. Breaking 
down the variance in a total sample, we are conducting an analysis of variance (Zikmund, et 
al., 2010).  
The F-distribution is a function (f) of the ratio between two sources of variance (Zikmund, et 
al., 2010) p. 546: 
F = f (
   
   
) 
The above is total variability portioned into SSB as between-groups variance, and SSE 
representing within-groups variance. The larger the F-value, the more likely is the result to be 
significant (Zikmund, et al., 2010), and in order to have a good model the F-value should at 
least be above 1.0 (Wenstøp, 2006). 
In addition, when we have checked that the F-test is significant, Zikmund et al. (2010) suggest 
in the next step to check all our individual statistical tests for every parameter estimate. By 
doing this, we can find our independent variables that are considered as significantly 
explainable. When we happen to find non-significant variables, we should re-run the model 
without these variables, often by deleting one predictor variable at the time (Zikmund, et al., 
2010), supporting our already planned approach when running the multiple regression 
analysis.  
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4.5.2 R-Squared in Multiple Regression 
The third step in analyzing our multiple regression models is by examining the model R-
Square.  Zikmund et al. (2010) explain that a multiple determination coefficient can be used to 
indicate the variation in our dependent variable (Y) given in a percentage and explained by all 
explanatory variables (Zikmund, et al., 2010). An example can be if we get a value R
2
 = 0.75, 
meaning that 75% of the variance in CEO Remuneration (Y) can be explained by our 
independent variables. Importantly, Zikmund et al. (2010) emphasizes that the absolute value 
of R
2
 is more proper when we want to predict rather than explain the dependent variable. This 
means that when we want to explain which variables that drive CEO pay, cutoff values from 
the R
2
 model are inappropriate (Zikmund, et al., 2010).   
4.5.3 Multicollinearity 
When conducting our multiple regression analysis, we need to check for multicollinearity. 
Wenstøp (2006) describes that no explanatory variable should be too highly correlated with 
each other. He explains that this can lead to difficulties with interpreting the individual 
parameter estimates; with high p-values it will be hard to see what the independent variables 
explain (Wenstøp, 2006). SPSS gives us the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) for each variable. 
Zikmund et al., (2010) uses a rule of thumb, saying that a VIF above 5.0 suggests problems 
with multicollinearity, while Wenstøp (2006) set this number to above 10 (Wenstøp, 2006). 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2002) used a VIF tolerance level of <10 and we will do the same in 
our analysis. SPSS will also give us tolerance, which according to Wenstøp (2006) indicates 
the percentage of variance in the explanatory variable that cannot be accounted for by the 
other explanatory variables. A tolerance value less than 0.10 may indicate a redundant 
explanatory variable (Wenstøp, 2006).  
4.5.4 Normality and Outliers 
Heteroscedasticity, described by Wenstøp (2006) as when the random variables have 
differences in their variance, will also be accounted for. We can check for heteroscedasticity 
by using the scatterplot (Wenstøp, 2006). Scatterplots can help us find the outliers, described 
by Zikmund et al. (2010) as values that lie outside the normal range of our data. Outliers 
having too high or low scores should be removed as a precaution not to cause errors in our 
multiple regression analysis. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest that variables shown in the 
scatter plot with a standardized residual above 3.3 or below -3.3, should be removed. 
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Finally we analyze the regression residuals for non-normal distribution. We examine the tails, 
and check for kurtosis and skewness (Wenstøp, 2006). When checking for non-normality in 
SPSS we will use the normal probability-probability plot (P-P plot). If the points on the graph 
lie approximately on the reference line, they indicate normality. If the points are above the 
reference line they indicate that the observed quantiles are lower than expected and vice versa 
(Landau & Everitt, 2004).  
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5 Data Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this chapter we present a selection of descriptive statistics from our findings. Descriptive 
statistics summarizes and describes the data in a simple and understandable manner 
(Zikmund, et al., 2010). Furthermore, in order to get a straightforward picture of the 
development in our data sample, we have developed a set of descriptive tables. The 
descriptive statistics are seen in context with executive compensation, and the purpose of this 
chapter is to view the advances or setbacks in that regard. We wish to make accessible to the 
reader a breakdown of the CEO (President Director) compensation seen in context with 
family ownership, Chinese ownership, government ownership, and foreign control. We will 
also present frequency tables of independent BOC (supervisory board) members and CEO 
compensation in relation with board size and firm size. Again we would like to remind our 
readers that President Director, in an Indonesian context, is the equivalent of the CEO.  
5.1.1 Annual Development in CEO Pay 
The annual change in CEO remuneration is given in Table 5-1, and as we can read from the 
table, there has been a steady increase in CEO pay on an annual basis. The table shows the 
minimum and maximum amount paid in compensation, and as we can see, there is a great 
difference between the smallest and largest amount paid. This tendency is evident for all 
years. Included in the table is also the standard deviation, reflecting the dispersion of the 
distribution. This is the most valuable index of spread (Zikmund, et al., 2010), and it gives us 
an indication of the dispersion in our sample. The largest growth rates are from 2007 to 2008, 
while the growth between 2008 and 2009 is not that significant. The reason for this may be 
applied to the recession of 2008, but Indonesia does not rely that heavily on international 
trade, consequently they should not feel the effects of the financial crisis that hard. Still, the 
difference in growth between the three years is evident, and the financial crisis may very well 
be an explanatory factor in that regard.    
 N Minimum
* 
Maximum
* 
Mean
* 
Std. Deviation
* 
CEO pay 2009 46 142 598 688 7 227 200 000 1 908 738 501 1 661 225 798 
CEO pay 2008 46 122 200 776 7 529 800 000 1 763 515 676 1 647 105 991 
CEO pay 2007 45 95 611 024 4 740 100 000 1 309 388 576 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-1: Annual development in CEO pay 2007-2009  
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To give a more exact picture of the yearly change in CEO remuneration, we corrected for 
inflation in Table 5-3 using the inflation rates given in Table 5-2.  
Year 
Inflation rates 
Indonesia 
2008 6.30% 
2009 9.90% 
2010 4.80% 
2011 5.10% 
Table 5-2: Inflation rates in Indonesia from 2008 – 2011 (Indexmundi, 2011) 
 N Mean
* 
PV of Mean
* 
Growth 
CEO pay 2009 46 1 908 738 501 2 102 376 205 -1.52% 
CEO pay 2008 46 1 763 515 676 2 134 720 837 26.70% 
CEO pay 2007 45 1 309 388 576 1 684 858 771  
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-3: Annual development in CEO pay (2011) corrected for inflation  
Table 5-3 shows the present value (PV) of the mean remuneration given to CEOs in the 
period 2007-2009. We have also applied the growth ratio, showing that by 2011 values, there 
has been a small decrease in the amount of remuneration paid to the CEOs on an average 
basis from 2008 to 2009. Table 5-3 further strengthens the analysis above. There is a strong 
growth from 2007 to 2008, which might be explained by the increasing economic growth in 
Indonesia after the Asian economic crisis in 97/98.  
 N 
PV of Mean 
IDR 
Converted to 
USD
14
 
Converted to 
NOK
14 
CEO pay 2009 46 2 102 376 205 260 131 1 377 056 
CEO pay 2008 46 2 134 720 837 264 133 1 398 242 
CEO pay 2007 45 1 684 858 771 208 471 1 103 582 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-4: CEO pay converted into USD and NOK - 2011 
                                                          
14 1000 Rupiah = 0.66 NOK and 0.12 USD according to DnB NOR on April 27, 2011 (DnB, 2011) 
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In addition, we convert the PV in Rupiah into both U.S. Dollars and Norwegian Kroner in 
order to make it easier to interpret the pay levels for international readers, shown in Table 5-4. 
The figure below graphically illustrates the yearly development of CEO compensation, as 
presented in Table 5-3. We can clearly see the already mentioned large increase in CEO 
remuneration from 2007 to 2008, and the relatively stable state in pay from 2008 to 2009.  
 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Figure 5-1: PV Annual CEO Pay (mean) 
Note that if we should make a generalization of these results, growth rates for several more 
years are needed.  
5.1.2 CEO Pay in Family- and Non-Family Owned Companies 
The following table gives an overview of the difference between executive compensation in 
family owned firms and non-family owned firms. Defining family firms in Indonesia is a 
complicated process. The majority of listed companies are controlled by families or 
approximately 10 large family-owned groups (World Bank, 2010). In the annual reports, it is 
rarely disclosed whether or not the company in question is a family owned company, and to 
determine if it is a family company we had to trace the ownership of the company to the very 
end. In 43.5% of our sample, we were able to identify the company as being family owned. 
The rest are either government owned, foreign controlled, or simply independent companies.  
0
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For the analysis of Table 5-5, the tendency is clear; executives in non-family controlled firms 
earn more than those in family controlled firms. We can also interpret from the table that there 
is a steady growth in compensation, in both family and non-family firms.  
 Ownership Mean
*
 N Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
Non-family 2 404 540 187 26 1 879 755 854 
Family 1 264 196 310 20 1 055 016 967 
Total 1 908 738 501 46 1 661 225 798 
 
2008 
Non-family 2 287 883 536 27 1 920 815 924 
Family 1 018 361 348 19 674 183 801 
Total 1 763 515 676 46 1 647 105 991 
2007 
Non-family 1 557 191 473 27 1 192 675 685 
Family 937 684 231 18 647 104 240 
Total 1 309 388 576 45 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-5: CEO pay in family and non-family firms 2007-2009 
We acknowledge skewness between family- and non-family owned companies in our sample, 
but we consider the sample size large enough to provide a representative tendency.  
5.1.3 CEO Pay in Chinese- and Non-Chinese Owned Companies 
Among the firms listed on IDX, many companies can be traced back to being owned by 
powerful Chinese conglomerates – which have had an undisputable influence on Indonesian 
economy for decades. Chinese influence on the Indonesian economy is a fact, and the 
development of the country can, to some degree, be credited to the Chinese. To determine 
whether or not companies are owned by Chinese conglomerates, we use the same procedure 
as with the family companies; we had to retrace the ownership-trail of the parent companies. 
It should be noted that the categorization of foreign control and Chinese ownership to some 
degree get intertwined. The distinction relates to Chinese owners in Indonesia and Chinese 
owners in China. 
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 Ownership Mean
* 
N Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
Non-Chinese 2 045 717 336 36 1 752 785 555 
Chinese 1 415 614 695 10 1 226 966 163 
Total 1 908 738 501 46 1 661 225 798 
2008 
Non-Chinese 1 965 867 129 36 1 791 404 476 
Chinese 1 035 050 445 10 575 701 578 
Total 1 763 515 676 46 1 647 105 991 
2007 
Non-Chinese 1 433 565 548 35 1 115 497 337 
Chinese 874 769 174 10 624 670 889 
Total 1 309 388 576 45 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-6: CEO pay in Chinese- and non-Chinese owned companies 2007-2009 
We acknowledge that Chinese owned companies are represented by no more than 29% of our 
sample. As in the case of family companies versus non-family owned companies, we believe 
that the descriptive results presented above give a representative tendency for the population.  
The table indicates that Chinese owned companies tend to pay less than companies not 
controlled by Chinese. This tendency is consistent with all years, and the increase in pay does 
not show any significant large or small growth rate for any particular year.  
5.1.4 CEO Pay in Foreign- and Non-Foreign Owned Companies 
Foreign investment in Indonesia is increasing, especially from neighboring countries; 
Singapore, Malaysia, India and China in particular, but also western countries like the 
Netherlands, the UK, Germany and the U.S.
15
. We distinguished between foreign owned and 
non-foreign owned companies by looking at the percentage of foreign ownership as a total. If 
the total percentage of ownership exceeded the amount of any other domestic shareholder, it 
got categorized as foreign owned.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Data should be interpreted with caution as “foreign” shares are reportedly off-shore Indonesian capital coming 
back into the country (World Bank, 2010) 
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 Ownership Mean
* 
N Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
Domestic 1 977 837 369 37 1 772 164 482 
Foreign 1 624 665 378 9 1 130 367 835 
Total 1 908 738 501 46 1 661 225 798 
2008 
 Domestic 1 820 338 571 36 1 793 103 717 
 Foreign 1 558 953 253 10 1 000 871 150 
Total 1 763 515 676 46 1 647 105 991 
2007 
Domestic 1 343 341 159 34 1 093 983 161 
Foreign 1 204 444 230 11 926 995 916 
Total 1 309 388 576 45 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-7: CEO pay in foreign- and non-foreign owned companies 2007-2009 
Table 5-7 indicates a small difference between foreign- and domestic owned companies, in 
favor of domestic owned companies, but we believe that a larger sample would be appropriate 
to make any generalization of the result. The conclusion we can draw from the above figures, 
are that domestic-owned companies pay slightly more than foreign owned companies. The 
results further confirm the growth in annual pay that we have shown in the previous tables. 
This is true for both domestic- and foreign owned companies.  
5.1.5 CEO Pay in Government- and Non-Government Owned Companies 
The national government of Indonesia controls 114 companies through the Ministry of State 
Owned Enterprises, whereas 16 companies were listed on the IDX as of January 2010 (World 
Bank, 2010). In our data collection we observed 10 companies where the government of 
Indonesia was listed as the major shareholder. Common to all cases is that the government of 
Indonesia owns a significant share of stock (70% - 90%). It was a forgiving task to organize 
companies into the two categories presented in the table.  
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  Ownership Mean
* 
N Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
Non-government 1 460 906 182 36 1 150 256 866 
Government 3 520 934 849 10 2 227 737 141 
Total 1 908 738 501 46 1 661 225 798 
2008 
Non-government 1 368 065 842 36 1 216 794 740 
Government 3 187 135 077 10 2 220 256 833 
Total 1 763 515 676 46 1 647 105 991 
2007 
Non-government 1 125 596 680 35 891 904 231 
Government 1 952 660 214 10 1 328 361 352 
Total 1 309 388 576 45 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-8: CEO pay in government- and non-government owned companies 2007-2009 
The results show a significant difference between government owned and non-government 
owned companies. The immediate assumption is that an executive in a government owned 
company will be greatly compensated as compared to an executive in a non-government 
owned company. The standard deviation however, gives an indication that there exists a larger 
spread in the salaries of CEOs in government owned companies than in firms not controlled 
by the government. The issue of the sample size could of course be argued to present some 
degrees of error, but the large difference in compensation is in any case hard to ignore. We 
believe such a strong indication of the difference in salaries is representative for the 
population.  
5.1.6 Frequency of Independent BOC Members 
According to the listing requirements of the IDX, the BOC should consist of at least 30% 
independent directors (IDX, 2004). The ROSC on Indonesia (World Bank, 2010) states that 
companies mostly comply with this requirement, but they seldom exceed it.  
The table below illustrates the frequency of independent directors in the boards in all the three 
years. Our findings coincide with the findings of the ROSC. We can interpret from the table 
that most companies meet the IDXs requirements of 30% independent commissioners or 
more, and that the highest frequencies are in the proximity of the requirement (30%-49%). 
What we discovered, is that a few companies do not meet the 30% quota. Reasons for this 
might be because the companies got listed before the IDX listing requirements of 2004 came 
into force. 
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5.1.7 CEO Pay Compared to Board Size 
We have earlier mentioned the impact board size might have on the top executives‟ 
remuneration. Previous research often show that there is a positive relationship between the 
amount paid to the president director and board size; the larger the board, the greater the pay 
to the president director. 
From the descriptive statistics below, we cannot make a generalized conclusion to whether or 
not this relationship exists in Indonesian companies. The mean compensation varies 
inconsistently between the different board sizes. We can however make the inference that 
large boards lead to salaries above the total mean, and observe that the lowest means most 
frequently relates to small boards.  
The issue related to our relatively small sample size is also evident in this case, as we have 
very few companies represented by a board size of six commissioners or more. This may in 
turn indicate a tendency in Indonesian companies that large boards are not that common. A 
board size of five commissioners, including the chairman, seems to be the reoccurring median 
for all years. If we look at the cases of five commissioners and below, we observe that the 
mean salary is larger in boards with five members, than those with fewer members. This is 
 
Ind. BOC 
members Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2009 
0% -   29% 3 6.5 6.5 
30% -   49% 29 63.1 69.6 
50% -   69% 12 26.1 95.7 
75% - 100% 2 4.3 100.0 
Total 46 100.0  
2008 
0% -   29% 7 15.2 15.2 
30% -   49% 27 58.7 73.9 
50% -   69% 10 21.7 95.6 
75% - 100% 2 4.4 100 
Total 46 100.0  
2007 
   0%  -  29% 6 13.0 13.0 
 30% -   49% 29 63.0 76.0 
 50% -   69% 10 21.7 97.7 
 75% - 100% 1 2.2 100.0 
Total 46 100.0  
Table 5-9: Frequency of independent BOC members 
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true for all years except 2007 where we observe a discrepancy in boards consisting of three 
members.  
 Board 
members Mean
* 
N Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
2 1 142 230 325 3 1 021 046 556 
3 1 313 621 958 11 1 239 028 563 
4 585 977 564 7 329 782 261 
5 2 694 743 920 16 1 862 688 675 
6 2 440 948 030 6 1 912 155 487 
7 980 268 750 1 . 
8 3 329 372 930 1 . 
9 3 752 363 010 1 . 
Total 1 908 738 501 46 1 661 225 798 
2008 
1 815 337 020 1 . 
2 952 752 675 2 54 900 315 
3 1 593 832 882 9 1 364 191 962 
4 588 746 707 9 338 470 699 
5 2 443 045 403 14 2 166 942 650 
6 2 300 595 049 8 1 721 889 488 
7 2 593 854 720 1 . 
9 1 531 190 910 1 . 
12 2 025 220 740 1 . 
Total 1 763 515 676 46 1 647 105 991 
2007 
2 791 906 465 2 51 965 624 
3 1 351 669 847 10 912 708 148 
4 819 692 461 5 444 853 715 
5 1 272 834 364 19 1 318 141 457 
6 1 741 978 356 7 919 538 152 
7 1 315 136 510 1 . 
12 2 030 674 300 1 . 
Total 1 309 388 576 45 1 047 159 875 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-10: CEO pay compared to board size 
5.1.8 CEO Pay Compared to Firm Size 
The last descriptive statistics we present are mean executive pay for each year, seen in context 
with the mean firm size of the sample. From Table 5-11 we can read that firm size is growing 
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together with the executive pay. Even though CEO pay on average have a slightly higher 
growth rate than firm size, it is hard to generalize due to the small sample size. Another aspect 
of the statistics worth noticing is the large standard deviation compared to mean firm size. 
This indicates a great spread in firm size, and this makes it harder to make any assumptions 
based on the result of the table.  
 No. of  
Firms 
Mean
* 
Growth rate Std. Deviation
* 
2009 
CEO pay 46 1 908 738 501 8.24% 1 661 225 798 
Firm size 46 4790.72E9 7.79% 10057.97E9 
2008 
CEO pay 46 1 763 515 675 34.68% 1 647 105 991 
Firm size 46 4444.65E9 28.77% 9431.31E9 
2007 
CEO pay 46 1 309 388 576 - 1 047 159 875 
Firm size 46 3451.50E9 - 8890.98E9 
*
Values in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) - 1000 Rupiah = 0.12 USD (DnB NOR April 27, 2011) 
Table 5-11: CEO pay compared to firm size 
If any general conclusion were to be made from Table 5-11, it is that top executive pay in 
Indonesian companies is highly sensitive to increase in firm size. But again, we have to stress 
that the results are made on the basis of a relatively small sample size and this may affect the 
final outcome. For a more conclusive result, a larger sample size is preferred. 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
After looking at the descriptive data, a correlation analysis is the appropriate next step in 
finding determinants that can further explain CEO compensation. As already mentioned, 
checking the correlations between all our variables can help us develop a well-functioning 
multiple regression analysis.  These correlation results are indicators of which determinants 
that are relevant to the total pay granted to the CEO.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
We will check separately for correlations between CEO pay in 2008 and 2009 and all other 
time-adjusted explanatory variables. Since we use the average ROE and a one year lag on the 
other variables, combining the two years is not needed as we already cover for any unusual 
changes and irregular pay evaluations. The table below shows our bivariate correlations 
between the dependent and explanatory variables, based on CEO remuneration in 2008.  
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Variables 
(Year-end 2007 unless otherwise 
stated) 
Mean Std. 
Deviation Correlation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) CEO pay (log) 20.897 .932 1       
(2) Firm size (log) 6.804 1.807 .742*** 1      
(3) Firm performance  22.416 86.923 .074 .129 1     
(4) Family (dummy)  .390 .493 -.256* -.458*** -.166 1    
(5) Government (dummy)  .220 .417 .415*** .512*** -.001 -.423*** 1   
(6) BOC size 4.650 1.622 .215 .333** -.048 -.076 .213 1  
(7) Board independence .394 .132 .078 .072 -.138 -.006 .159 .173 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
CEO compensation is measured as the natural logarithm of the total executive compensation of 2008 (CEO 
compensation was extracted using the CEO pay extraction equation). Firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total revenues. Firm performance is measured using ROE (Return on Equity) as a two year 
average for 2007 and 2008. ROE is annual net income divided by end-of-year equity of shareholders. Family 
Owned is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is owned by a family and 0 otherwise. Government Owned 
is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is owned by the Indonesian Government and 0 otherwise. BOC size 
is measured as the number of member in the Board of Commissioners. Board independence is measured as 
the ratio of independent board members in the Board of Commissioners.  
Table 5-12: Pearson correlation matrix on CEO compensation 2008 
Above we see the correlations based on CEO pay in 2008 and adjusted respective explanatory 
variables. We find three explanatory variables that show a significant relationship with the 
CEO compensation, two positive and one negative.              
As presented earlier, firm size is usually a strong and positive explanatory variable on CEO 
pay. Our correlation indicates the same, showing a positive correlation of 0.742 at a 0.01 
significance level, indicating a strong and positive relationship with our dependent variable.  
Government ownership also has a moderate but positive (0.415) and significant (at the 0.01 
level) relationship with CEO pay. This comes as a surprise to us as we found previous 
research indicating the opposite in e.g. China (Firth et al., (2006).  
Notably, we see that firm size also has a positive and significant relationship with both BOC 
size and government ownership. This indicates that government owned firms are larger, and 
that large companies have more board members than smaller firms.  
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Finally we assert that family owned companies have negative and significant (p < 0.10) 
relationship with CEO remuneration. Family firms further show a negative and significant 
relationship with firm size, supporting our preliminary finding that the largest firms are 
government-, rather than family-owned, and compensate their CEO higher than the family 
firms. Again we have to remind our readers that our sample may not reflect the entire 
population of Indonesian listed companies, and that previously mentioned sampling errors 
may occur.  
Despite showing weak to moderate positive relationships with CEO pay, we failed to find any 
significant relationships between CEO remuneration and; firm performance, board size, and 
board independence respectively.  
Our results so far indicate that firm size is the dominating determinant to explain CEO 
remuneration. From our sample, it seems that firms owned by the Indonesian Government are 
larger than family owned firms, relationships that may cause complications in our multiple 
regression analysis. While we have looked at determinants of CEO pay in 2008, we will now 
look at the Pearson correlation for CEO compensation in 2009, intending to utterly reduce the 
chance of misinterpretations due to unforeseen events which may have happened during that 
period.  
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Variables 
(Year-end 2008 unless otherwise 
stated) 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Correlation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) CEO pay (log)  20.982 .948 1       
(2) Firm size (log) 7.003 2.086 .721** 1      
(3) Firm performance  20.299 67.702 .069 .149 1     
(4) Family (dummy)  .410 .498 -.322* -.522** -.199 1    
(5) Government (dummy)  .220 .417 .447** .442** .025 -.442** 1   
(6) BOC size 4.650 1.828 .410** .478** -.030 -.083 .160 1  
(7) Board independence .392 .165 .229 .045 -.070 -.013 .156 .005 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
CEO compensation is measured as the natural logarithm of the total executive compensation of 2009 (CEO 
compensation was extracted using the CEO pay extraction equation). Firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total revenues. Firm performance is measured using ROE (Return on Equity) as a three year 
average for 2007, 2008, and 2009. ROE is annual net income divided by end-of-year equity of shareholders. 
Family Owned is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is owned by a family and 0 otherwise. Government 
Owned is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is owned by the Indonesian Government and 0 otherwise. BOC 
size is measured as the number of member in the Board of Commissioners. Board independence is measured as 
the ratio of independent board members in the Board of Commissioners.  
Table 5-13: Pearson correlation matrix on CEO compensation 2009 
In the table above we can see that four explanatory variables have significant correlations to 
CEO remuneration, with three being positive and one negative.   
Based on CEO pay in 2008 we already saw firm size as a strong explanatory determinant, and 
our 2009 CEO compensation shows the same, seeing a positive correlation of 0.721 between 
firm size and CEO pay at a 0.01 significance level. This indicates a strong and significant 
relationship in line with our expectations, while the three significant variables remaining 
showed moderate relationships in respect to our dependent variable. 
Board size also proves a significant (p < 0.01) and positive (0.410) correlation to CEO pay. 
Simultaneously we see that size of the board is positively correlated to firm size as well, 
meaning that larger firms often have larger boards. This relationship should be accounted for 
and double-checked when we conduct our multiple regression analysis.  
Interestingly, government owned firms still have a significant and positive correlation with 
CEO compensation. At a 0.01 significance level with positive correlation of 0.447, 
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government ownership is a good candidate for being a positive determinant for larger CEO 
remuneration.  Note that firm size still is significantly and positively correlated to government 
ownership, indicating that the largest firms are government owned.                                                                                                                
Contrary to government ownership, family ownership shows a negative (-0.322) and 
significant (0.05 level) relationship to the pay granted to the chief executive officer. Not 
surprisingly, family firms also show a significant and negative correlation with firm size, 
suggesting that family firms are smaller than government owned firms; hence they are paying 
less to their CEO.   
Related to CEO remuneration, we fail to find any significant relationship with neither firm 
performance nor board independence. While board independence shows a weak, but 
insignificant, positive correlation with our dependent variable, firm performance shows close 
to zero correlation (0.069) which indicates a lack of relationship with CEO pay.  
5.3 Regression Analysis 
In this subchapter we intend to perform a multiple regression analysis, meant to illuminate 
any relationship between our dependent variable and the explanatory (independent) variables. 
The effects of the explanatory variables are investigated simultaneously, as opposed to the 
bivariate correlation analysis in the previous chapter. The analysis will assist us in being able 
to accept or reject the research hypotheses which we developed for the thesis.  
In explaining the results from Table 5-14, we will base our analysis on the four steps 
presented by Zikmund; examine the F-statistic, examine the individual statistical test for each 
parameter estimate, examine the model R
2
, and finally examine the collinearity statistic.  
In our analysis we have tested relationships on four models for both years; one model 
including our controlling variables industry and CEO characteristics (CEO tenure and CEO 
level of education), and the second model with only the explanatory variables. To further 
increase the explanatory power of our models, we developed models 3 and 4 consisting of 
variables with t-values above 1.0. Models 3 and 4 are extensions of models 1 and 2 
respectively.  
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All independent variables in our model have proven both through our correlative analysis and 
in previous research, to explain CEO remuneration; hence we used a forced entry method 
when inserting the variables in the linear regression model in SPSS. A stepwise approach 
would be more appropriate if the variables were considered to be of a more exploratory 
nature, in which case SPSS would eliminate the variables with minimal significance 
automatically, while we want to plot the all the statistical results in the model.  
5.3.1 Models 1 and 2 
We start by formulating our two first models according to the linear regression model 
presented in Chapter 4.5. 
Model 1: 
Total CEO Compensationt (log) = α + β1 × ROEmean + β2 × Firm Sizet-1 (log) + β3 × 
Board Sizet-1 + β4 × Board Independencet-1 + β5 × CEO Tenuret-1 + β6 × Government 
Owned Dummies + β7 × Family Firm Dummies + β8 × CEO Education Dummies + βi × 
Industry Dummies 
Model 2: 
Total CEO Compensationt (log) = α + β1 × ROEmean + β2 × Firm Sizet-1 (log) + β3 × 
Board Sizet-1 + β4 × Board Independencet-1 + β5 × Government Owned Dummies + β6 × 
Family Firm Dummies 
The output from running the regression analysis in SPSS for models 1 and 2 is presented in 
Table 5-14.  
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Predicted 
relationship 
2009 2008 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm size + 
.633 .656 .741 .776 
(3.937)
***
 (4.498)
*** 
(4.968)
*** 
(5.718)
*** 
Firm performance + 
-.006 .002 .022 -.005 
(-.050) (.017) (.178) (-.043) 
Family (dummy) - 
.114 .101 .189 .128 
(.787) (.774) (1.294) (1.030) 
Government 
(dummy) 
+ 
.175 .161 .092 .080 
(1.350) (1.326) (.620) (.621) 
BOC size + 
.158 .078 -.015 -.054 
(1.182) (.649) (-.113) (-.470) 
Board independence - 
.157 .175 .046 .018 
(1.510) (1.668) (.394) (.167) 
      
      
CEO characteristics  YES NO YES NO 
Industry dummies  YES NO YES NO 
      
Number of firms  46 46 46 46 
Adjusted R-square  .557 .521 .482 .499 
F-Statistic  4.322
*** 
9.167
*** 
3.460
*** 
8.472
*** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed) 
Standardized beta values reported with t-statistics in parentheses 
Table 5-14: Output from regression analysis - Model 1 and 2 
Results of Model 1: 
When controlling for industry and CEO characteristics in addition to the explanatory 
variables, we can read from Table 5-14 that the model is significant at the 0.01 level for both 
2009 and 2008 with an F-statistic reading respectively 4.322 and 3.460. Based on the 
significance of the F-statistic, we do not dismiss the model at this stage. 
Examining the individual statistical results for each parameter, we find that only firm size 
indicates a significant effect on the dependent variable. It is significant at the 0.01 level with a 
t-value of 3.937 for 2009 and 4.968 in 2008. In the correlation analysis we found that Family 
owned, government owned, and BOC size all had significant correlations with CEO pay in 
2009, while family owned and government owned had significant correlations with CEO pay 
in 2008. We can read from the correlation analysis that these variables also had significant 
correlations with firm size, which leads us to believe that firm size, affect them more than 
they affect the model. This can explain the lack of significance in the regression model.  
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The adjusted R-square shows an explanatory power of 55.7% and 48.2% in 2009 and 2008 
respectively. As we want to explain the impact on CEO pay, as opposed to predict the impact, 
we can argue about the suitability of the R-square. However, the R-square indicates a strong 
explanatory power, but we wish again to stress that our sample is very small and this may lead 
to an overestimation of the true value of the population.  
As explained earlier, we want to test for multicollinearity with the parameters of VIF < 10 and 
Tolerance > 0.10. Common for all variables is that they all meet these requirements for both 
years in model 1. This indicates a low degree of multicollinearity, which effectively gives 
further credibility to the model.  
We extend our analysis beyond the four steps presented by Zikmund (2010) to involve a test 
for heteroscedasticity by using scatterplots. Testing for heteroscedasticity we plot the 
standardized residuals (ZRESID) against the standardized predicted values (ZPRED). To keep 
any variable, it should be confined within the parameters 3.3 and -3.3 in the scatterplot 
diagram. Interpreting the figures, we find no outliers in the model, which implies 
homoscedasticity for both years. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Scatterplots for Model 1 – 2008 and 2009 
 
Finally we test for non-normality in our analysis on Model 1. Normality requires the points on 
the graph in the P-P Plot diagram to lie approximately on, or close to, the reference line. The 
figure below indicates normality of the model as no points deviate significantly from the 
reference line. 
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Figure 5-3: P-P-Plots for Model 1 - 2008 and 2009 
Results of Model 2: 
In Model 2 we excluded the controlling variables to see if they had any significant impact on 
the model. We can see from the regression table that the F-statistic is significant for both 
years with p < 0.01, and F-values of 9.167 in 2009 and 8.472 in 2008. Seeing as the F-value is 
significant for both years in Model 2, we do not dismiss the model at this stage. 
Similar to results from Model 1, firm size is the only variable indicating a significant effect on 
the dependent variable for Model 2. It is significant at the 0.01 level with t-values of 4.498 for 
2009 and 5.718 for 2008. The same argument regarding the correlation analysis and it 
showing significant correlation for the other variables; family owned, government owned and 
BOC size, can be made also in this case.  
The Adjusted R-square tells us that Model 2, in 2009, explains 52.1% of the predictors of 
CEO compensation, and in 2008 we have an explanatory power of 49.9%. This result is not 
that different from the results of Model 1, which leads us to assume that the impact of the 
controlling variables industry and CEO characteristics is minimal at best. 
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Testing for multicollinearity, we find that the variables meet the parameter requirements 
specified for VIF and Tolerance; VIF < 10 and Tolerance > 0.10.  
We apply the same statistical tool to test for heteroscedasticity by using scatterplots for Model 
2 as well. As we can read from the figure, we find no outliers in this model either, which 
implies homoscedasticity for both years.Finally in our analysis on Model 2, we test for non-
normality. The figures below indicate normality of the model, as no points deviate 
significantly from the reference line. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Scatterplots for Model 2 - 2008 and 2009 
Figure 5-5:  P-P-Plots for Model 2 - 2008 and 2009 
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5.3.2 Models 3 and 4 
The next step in our regression analysis is to extend the first two models to deal with only the 
variables with a t-value of 1.0 or more - this to increase the explanatory power of the model. 
Seeing as the output from the two years has different values, this will reflect the derivation of 
models 3 and 4. The new models will be different for 2008 and 2009 as the two years show a 
difference in which values have t-values above 1.0.   
From a general perspective we can say that Model 3 equals: 
              (   )    (∑  
 
   
                    )                       
And Model 4 can be generalized as follows: 
              (   )    (∑  
 
   
                    ) 
Model 3 for 2009 is equal to Model 1 less firm performance and family dummies. Model 3 for 
2008 is equal to Model 1 less firm performance, government dummies, BOC size, and board 
independence. 
Model 4 for 2009 is equal to Model 2 less firm performance, family dummies, and BOC size. 
Model 4 for 2008 is equal to Model 2 less firm performance, government dummies, BOC Size 
and board independence.  
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Running the regression in SPSS, we present the following output: 
 
 
Predicted 
relationship 
2009 2008 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Firm size + 
.580 .656 .774 .790 
(4.092)
***
 (5.818)
*** 
(6.344)
*** 
(6.934)
*** 
Firm performance + 
    
    
Family (dummy) - 
  .173 .105 
  (1.305) (.923) 
Government 
(dummy) 
+ 
.162 .129   
(1.326) (1.132)   
BOC size + 
.187    
(1.488)    
Board independence - 
.157 .179   
(1.549) (1.749)
* 
  
      
      
CEO characteristics  YES NO YES NO 
Industry dummies  YES NO YES NO 
      
Number of firms  46 46 46 46 
Adjusted R-square  .577 .541 .537 .538 
F-Statistic  5.091
*** 
18.651
*** 
5.009
*** 
27.242
*** 
***Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);  
*Significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
Standardized beta values reported with t-statistics in parentheses 
Table 5-15: Output from regression analysis - Model 3 and 4 
Results of Model 3: 
From the outputs in Table 5-15, we interpret that the F-statistic for both years are significant 
at the 0.01 level, with values of 5.091 and 5.009 for 2009 and 2008 respectively. The model is 
still strongly significant, which comes as no surprise since less important variables have been 
extracted.  
Even with the modifications to Model 1, we still find that firm size is the only variable with a 
significant effect on the dependent variable. For 2009, firm size is significant at the 0.01 level 
with a t-value of 4.092. The standardized beta of firm size and government ownership has 
decreased compared to the results from Model 1, while BOC size has increased. This 
indicates that with firm performance and government ownership taken out of the equation, 
BOC size will have a greater impact on the size of BOC compensation, whilst firm size and 
government ownership will have less impact than that presented in Model 1. For 2008, we 
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find that firm size is significant at the 0.01 level with a t-value of 6.344. In Model 1 we only 
have two variables with t-values > 1.0, and comparing the two models, we find that b-values 
have increased for firm size and decreased for family, indicating a greater impact for firm size 
on the dependent variable.  
The adjusted R-square indicates an increase in the explanatory power of the models, with 
57.7% and 53.7% compared to 55.7% and 48.2% in Model 1, respective of 2009 and 2008. 
The explanatory properties of the variables have increased with approximately 2%, leaving 
out variables with t < 1.0 from Model 1. This show increased significance for the selected 
variables.  
All variables meet the requirements of the VIF and Tolerance parameters, for both years. This 
indicates a low degree of multicollinearity for Model 3.  
From the scatterplot-diagram we see that all variables are confined within the parameter of 3.3 
and -3.3, which implies homoscedasticity for both years. From the P-P Plots of Model 3 for 
2009 and 2008 we find that the points on the graph lies in close proximity to the reference 
line, confirming normality of the model. The diagrams can be located in appendices 6 and 7.  
Results of Model 4: 
In our fourth model, we use the same properties of Model 2 excluding all variables with t-
values < 1.0. Similar to our previous models, the F-statistic is significant at the 0.01 level, 
with F = 18.651 for 2009 and F = 27.242 for 2008. The same analytical conclusion can be 
drawn from these results as that from Model 3; the model is highly significant due to the 
extraction of less important variables.  
The individual statistical results show that firm size still is the most influential variable on 
CEO compensation, with a significance level of 0.01 for both years. However, we find that 
board independence has increased to a 0.10 significance level in 2009, when extracting firm 
performance and family dummies from the regression analysis. We see the same alteration 
tendency of the beta-values as in Model 3. Firm size and government ownership both have a 
slight decrease in beta-values. BOC size and board independence impact on the dependent 
variable, on the other hand, have increased slightly. In 2008, we find the same change as in 
Model 3. Firm size has increased in impact whilst Family has a small decrease in impact on 
the dependent variable.  
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We experience a change in the explanatory power of the model as compared to Model 2. The 
adjusted R-square indicates that the model explains 51.1% of the variation in CEO 
compensation in 2009 and 53.8% in 2008. This growth implies greater explanatory abilities in 
Model 4 compared to Model 2. The difference between Model 3 and 4 is minimal, which 
leads us to draw the same conclusion as before; industry and CEO characteristics are not 
significant in explaining the variance in CEO compensation.  
When testing for multicollinearity, we find that all variables meet the requirements of VIF < 
10, and Tolerance > 0.10. There are acceptable levels of multicollinearity in the model.  
The scatterplot diagram indicates homoscedasticity for the model, and seeing how the points 
on the P-P Plot confine themselves close to the reference line, we can confirm that normality 
applies for this model as well. The diagrams can be located in appendices 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
6 Findings and Discussion 
In this chapter we will present our findings in relation to the developed research hypotheses, 
and consequently discuss our output in relation with theory, previous research, and empirical 
findings on the field. As we have stressed in previous chapters, results of this type of research 
on Indonesia are limited and we have to compare our findings to that of other emerging 
countries.  
We want to see our hypotheses in context with our statistical results. Below follows a review 
of each hypothesis:  
H1: There is a positive relation between firm size and CEO compensation 
From our correlation analysis we find that firm size is significantly correlated with CEO 
compensation at the 0.01 level, with a correlation coefficient of .742 in 2008. The regression 
analysis further confirms this result for all models in 2008. The significance of firm size to 
CEO compensation holds, both with and without the controlling variables. The exclusions of 
any variable with a t-value < 1.0 in Model 3 and 4 only helps to increase the significance of 
Firm Size as an explanatory variable.  
In 2009, we find in the correlation analysis that firm size is significant at the 0.01 level with a 
correlation coefficient of .721. As with the results from 2008, the multivariate analysis 
verifies a significant relationship for all models in 2009.  
The results indicate that the hypothesis is supported, and that there is a statistically significant 
and strong positive relationship between firm size and CEO compensation. 
H2: There is a positive relation between firm performance and CEO compensation 
The correlation analysis for 2008 reveals a weak and insignificant relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation, with a correlation coefficient of .074. With t-values < 
1.0 in the regression analysis for models 1 and 2, firm performance was deducted for further 
analysis in models 3 and 4. 
In 2009, the correlation analysis gives a correlation coefficient of .069 between firm 
performance and CEO compensation indicating a weak, statistically insignificant, correlation. 
This further strengthens the results from 2008. As for the multivariate analysis, we had to 
deduct firm performance in models 3 and 4 for the same reason as in 2008. With t-values < 
1.0, it only helps to increase errors in the models.  
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We could not find any statistical significance to support the hypothesis.    
H3: There is a negative relation between family owned firms and CEO compensation 
According to our results from the 2008 correlation analysis, we find that family ownership is 
significant at the 0.10 level with a correlation coefficient of -.256. This indicates a negative 
correlation as predicted in the hypothesis. The same is true for the correlation analysis of 
2009; Family ownership is significant at the 0.10 level with a correlation coefficient of -.322. 
We also observe that Family ownership has a significant negative relationship with firm size 
(p < 0.01) for both years, and this may help to explain why the regression analysis is not able 
to prove any significant relationship between family ownership and CEO compensation. 
However, the t-values in 2008 are higher than 1.0, hence they are included in Model 3 and 4. 
The results from the two last models do not prove any significance. As for 2009, t-values are 
below 1.0 and are not included in models 3 and 4. Unable to validate any statistical 
significance of the relationship between Family ownership and CEO compensation, we cannot 
support Hypothesis 3.      
H4: There is a positive relation between government ownership and CEO compensation 
The correlation between government ownership and CEO compensation shows a significant 
relationship at the 0.01 level with a positive correlation of .415 and .447 in 2008 and 2009 
respectively. We face the same issues in this case as with family ownership; government 
ownership shows a significant relationship with firm size (p < 0.01), but also with family 
ownership (p < 0.01). The regression analysis shows no statistical significance, and only 2009 
output gives t- values > 1.0 and are consequently included in models 3 and 4. In any of the 
cases, no statistical evidence of the significance is proven. Despite indications of a positive 
relationship in the correlation analysis, we cannot argue for the validity of this relationship 
based on the result of the regression analysis. We reject the hypothesis.    
H5: There is a positive relation between board size and CEO compensation 
Hypothesis 5 predicts a positive correlation between board size and CEO compensation, and 
the analysis of this correlation shows a positive (.215), but insignificant (p > 0.10) 
relationship in 2008. The correlation analysis from 2009 shows a positive (.410) and 
significant (p < 0.05) relationship between BOC size and the dependent variable. For both 
years, there seems to be a significant correlation with firm size at the 0.05 level. The 
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multivariate analysis indicates no significant relationship in any of the two years. Only Model 
1 for 2009 has a t-value > 1.0 and is included in model 3. In model 3, we still see no statisticly 
significant relationship between BOC size and CEO compensation. This indicates that the 
hypothesis is false.     
H6: There is a negative relation between the ratio of independent board members and CEO 
compensation 
The correlation analysis fails to justify this hypothesis. We find that there is a weak, but 
positive, insignificant correlation between board independence and CEO compensation. This 
is true for both years. Correlation coefficients show .078 and .229 for 2008 and 2009 
respectively. The multivariate analysis shows no significance of the relationship for any of the 
two years in model 1 and 2. The t-values for 2009 are above 1.0 for models 1 and 2, and are 
therefore included in models 3 and 4. What we find when analyzing Model 4, is that board 
independence show to be significant at the 0.10 level. However, the analysis indicates a 
positive relationship, so in conclusion we can say that the hypothesis is rejected.  
The results derived from our statistical analyses presented proof of only one of our hypotheses 
to be true, namely the predicted relationship between firm size and CEO compensation. This 
corresponds well to the findings of Firth, Feng and Rui (2006) and their similar study, 
conducted on Chinese companies. As mentioned, the basis for direct comparison between 
other studies in Indonesia is limited. The positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation is proven in other studies as well (see chapter on Previous Empirical Research), 
hence the result comes as no big surprise to us. firm performance on the other hand, was the 
determinant with the least impact on CEO Compensation. This corresponds poorly to agency 
theory predictions (Berle & Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; A. Smith, 1776), and the subject of the incentive effect of good performance. 
However, our results are similar to empirical evidence concluded by other studies; Boyd 
(1994), Miller (1995), and Randøy and Nielsen (2002) among others, did not find any 
significant relationship. Worthy of mentioning once more, is how studies on China revealed a 
weak relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation.  
When it comes to ownership structure, we were sure to find some evidence of any impact 
family- and government owned companies may have on the remuneration of the CEO. Taking 
a second glance at the result from the descriptive statistics, it was reasonable to assume a 
relationship. However, as the correlation analysis showed, both family ownership and 
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government ownership had strong correlations with firm size, and it is a fair assumption to 
make that the ownership structure determinants are stronger determinants of the firm size, 
than that of CEO compensation.   
As stated, previous research has revealed a positive relationship between board size and CEO 
compensation. We found that there exists no significant relationship between these two 
factors in the case of Indonesia. Again we find that the size of the board correlates heavier 
with firm size than CEO compensation, even though our descriptive statistics indicate 
otherwise. We have no direct foundation for comparison in any close-by emerging markets, 
but studies conducted in western-regions find a positive correlation as predicted in our 
hypothesis (Core, et al., 1999; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). We mentioned the growing 
implementation of corporate governance codes in Indonesia, and the codes focus on small and 
effective boards to counteract over-excessive compensation. As the results show, we were not 
able to prove any such relationship. 
The ratio of independent board members is also a subject manifested in the codes of corporate 
governance. We can argue for a negative relationship between the ratio of independent board 
members and CEO compensation with background in managerialism, and the subject of CEO 
influence of the board. With greater independence in the supervisory board, the influence of 
the CEO is suppressed. The two-tier board structure of Indonesian companies, which 
effectively prevents any person of entertaining the position as both CEO and chairman at the 
same time, may explain why we were not able to extract any statistical significant results to 
prove the hypothesis.  
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7 Conclusion and Limitations of the Study 
7.1 Conclusion 
We have made an effort to identify determinants that can explain CEO compensation in 
Indonesian listed companies. This study is unique, because as far as we know it is the only 
study of its kind on Indonesia.  
Weak corporate governance and the often perceived unfair compensation of the CEO is a hot 
topic in today‟s business sphere. Corporate governance literature emphasize the importance of 
compensating top management in accordance with principles of fairness, corporate 
responsibility, and compliance within the company and in dealings with the shareholders of 
the firm. Our experiences when collecting data coincides with the findings of the World 
Banks ROSC on Indonesia; there is a growing focus on implementation of corporate 
governance principles, but the degree of transparency is limited. The issues related to lack of 
disclosure within the annual reports, in particular related to details on top executive 
remuneration, may have had an impact on our results.  
Covering a period of three years from 2007 to 2009, we used CEO remuneration from 2009 
and 2008, while our explanatory variables mainly have values from 2007 and 2008. Amongst 
all our independent variables, our findings show that firm size is the only explanatory 
determinant of top executive compensation in Indonesia. Agency theory suggest a link 
between firm performance and CEO compensation by the use of value-increasing incentives, 
but our findings are not able to prove any such statistically significant relationship. This may 
indicate poor incentive systems in Indonesian companies, and could be an effect related to a 
low level of stock option agreements. Further, family ownership, government ownership, and 
BOC size all correlate stronger with firm size than with CEO compensation, which can help 
explain why they show no significant correlation in the multivariate analysis. The last 
variable, board independence, show no significant correlation with the dependent variable. 
In conclusion we did not find any evidence of strong statistical significance between CEO pay 
explanatory variables tested, except firm size. The multivariate analysis indicates a stronger 
explanatory power for firm size when not controlling for industry and CEO characteristics. 
The same is also true when excluding the variables that did not exceed t-values of 1.0.       
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7.2 Limitations of the Study 
We have already emphasized the limitations concerning the relatively small sample of our 
study. Comprising of 46 out of 415 Indonesian listed companies, we are aware that a larger 
sample would be appropriate in order to increase both the validity and reliability of our thesis. 
A smaller sample leads to difficulties in generalizing our results for the entire population, a 
problem stemming from the previous described unavailability of annual reports. The degrees 
of freedom given in our analysis indicate the adjustments done in response to our small 
sample. They show our number of observations less the amount of constraints or assumptions 
needed to be able to calculate a statistical term.   
Importantly we are aware that what we use as the total value of CEO compensation does not 
necessarily explain the full remuneration package. However, we believe that this thesis brings 
us one step closer to explaining determinants of CEO remuneration in Indonesia, as well as 
being an indicator of the pay levels for chief executive officers working in Indonesian listed 
companies. 
Low transparency levels in some of the annual reports may provide inaccurate or misleading 
information regarding the ownership-structure and family relationships within an Indonesian 
firm. Special for Indonesia, we should note that the majority of the population does not use 
family names and some even use only a single name, making it difficult to discover family 
relations within the Indonesian listed companies of our study. 
Conducting our analysis we are using two observation years per firm to exclude the 
possibility of experiencing one-year effects, although this may be at the expense of 
overstating the statistical relationships. Using explanatory variables with one year lag to our 
dependent variable, our explanatory variables are from 2007 and 2008, while the dependent 
variable is from 2008 and 2009. Due to time limitations of our study we measured the 
financial performance of a firm only by one accounting based measure (ROE). We 
acknowledge that also including a market-based (stock performance), or a combination of an 
accounting-based and a market-based measure (∆ market-to-book ratio) would have given a 
different result.  
7.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
Given the relatively large amount of time needed to obtain all the data in our analysis, we 
suggest future researchers to expand our models by including a greater sample of Indonesian 
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listed firms. Although our results are proven both statistically valid and reliable, a larger 
sample would be able to generalize the results and fully reflect the true population. Finally we 
recommend expanding the time frame from 3 to 5 years in order to utterly control for 
unforeseen events and one-year effects. 
Corporate governance can also be analyzed more in-depth by including a greater amount of 
explanatory variables combined with the already mentioned increase in sample size. 
With a low level of disclosure on CEO pay in Indonesia, we recommend the use of qualitative 
methods such as personal interviews, phone interviews, fax correspondences, and similar in 
order to obtain data describing CEO remuneration in Indonesia on a more detailed level. We 
believe that it is interesting to see how the pay structure is, regarding e.g. stock options, 
bonuses, LTIPs and other incentive systems.  
Finally we recommend a multinational research collaboration that include people with 
knowledge of the Bahasa Indonesia language and with further access to relevant information. 
this might help increase the explanatory power of our determinants on CEO compensation in 
Indonesia. 
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Appendix 1 – Detailed Country Assessment ROSC on Indonesia 
Summary of Observance of OECD Corporate Governance Principles in Indonesian 
listed companies (World Bank, 2010) 
FI = Fully Implemented; BI = Broadly Implemented; PI = Partially Implemented; NI = Not 
Implemented.  
 Principle FI BI PI NI 
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
IA Overall corporate governance framework   X  
IB Legal framework enforceable/transparent   X  
IC Clear division of regulatory responsibilities  X   
ID Regulatory authority, integrity, resources   X  
II. The rights of the shareholders and key ownership functions 
IIA Basic shareholder rights     
IIA 1 Secure methods of ownership registration  X   
IIA 2 Convey or transfer shares X    
IIA 3 Obtain relevant and material company information  X   
IIA 4 Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings X    
IIA 5 Elect and remove board members of the board X    
IIA 6 Share in profits of the corporation  X   
IIB Rights to part in fundamental decisions     
IIB 1 Amendments to statutes, or articles of incorporation  X   
IIB 2 Authorization of additional shares  X   
IIB 3 Extraordinary transactions, including sales of major corporate assets   X  
IIC Shareholders GMS rights     
IIC 1 Sufficient and timely information at the general meeting  X   
IIC 2 Opportunity to ask the board questions at the general meeting   X  
IIC 3 Effective shareholder participation in key governance decisions   X  
IIC 4 Availability to vote both in person or in absentia   X  
IID Disproportionate control disclosure    X 
IIE Control arrangements allowed to function     
IIE 1 Transparent and fair rules governing acquisition of corporate control   X  
IIE 2 Anti-take-over devices  X   
IIF Exercise of ownership rights facilitated     
IIF 1 Disclosure of corporate governance and voting policies by inst. investors   X  
IIF 2 Disclosure of management of material conflicts of interest by inst. investors   X  
IIG Shareholders allowed to consult each other X    
III. Equitable treatment of shareholders 
IIIA All shareholders should be treated equally     
IIIA 1 Equality, fairness and disclosure of rights within and between share classes   X  
IIIA 2 Minority protection from controlling shareholder abuse; minority redress   X  
IIIA 3 Custodian voting by instruction from beneficial owners  X   
IIIA 4 Obstacles to cross border voting should be eliminated  X   
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 Principle FI BI PI NI 
IIIA 5 Equitable treatment of all shareholders at GMs  X   
IIIB Prohibit insider trading   X  
IIIC Board/Mgrs. disclose interests   X  
IV. Role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
IVA Legal rights of stakeholders respected  X   
IVB Redress for violation of rights   X  
IVC Performance-enhancing mechanisms  X   
IVD Access to information  X   
IVE “Whistleblower” protection   X  
IVF Creditor rights law and enforcement   X  
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
VA Disclosure standards     
VA 1 Financial and operating results of the company  X   
VA 2 Company objectives  X   
VA 3 Major share ownership and voting rights   X  
VA 4 Remuneration policy for board and key executives   X  
VA 5 Related party transactions  X   
VA 6 Foreseeable risk factors  X   
VA 7 Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders   X  
VA 8 Governance structures and policies   X  
VB Standards of accounting & audit  X   
VC Independent audit annually   X  
VD External auditors should be accountable   X  
VE Fair & timely dissemination  X   
VF Research conflicts of interests   X  
VI. Responsibilities of the board 
VIA Acts with due diligence, care   X  
VIB Treat all shareholders fairly   X  
VIC Apply high ethical standards   X  
VID The board should fulfill certain key functions     
VID 1 Board oversight of general corporate strategy and major decisions  X   
VID 2 Monitoring effectiveness of company governance practices   X  
VID 3 Selecting/compensating/monitoring/replacing key executives   X  
VID 4 Aligning executive and board pay   X  
VID 5 Transparent board nomination/election process    X 
VID 6 Oversight of insider conflicts of interest  X   
VID 7 Oversight of accounting and financial reporting systems  X   
VID 8 Overseeing disclosure and communications processes   X  
VIE  Exercise objective judgment  X   
VIE 1 Independent judgment  X   
VIE 2 Clear and transparent rules on board committees   X  
VIE 3 Board commitment to responsibilities   X  
VIF Access to information   X  
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Appendix 2 – The CEO-pay Extraction Equation 
This appendix presents the argument on how to calculate an approximation of the total CEO 
(President Director) remuneration, when only given aggregated remuneration info in total for 
both the BOD and the BOC. 
During our data collection, we observed the following reported tendencies in distribution of 
pay; 
Directors under the CEO receive on approximation 90% of the CEOs pay. 
Chairman of the BOC (President Commissioner) receives on approximation 40% of the 
CEOs pay. 
Commissioners under the President Commissioner receive on approximation 36% of the 
CEOs pay, which is equal to 90% of the President Commissioners pay. 
When generalizing this distribution, it was fairly easy to develop an equation with only one 
unknown constant; CEO pay. The total BOD and BOC pay equals the sum of CEO pay and 
the sum of directors, president commissioner‟s and commissioners pay multiplied with their 
respective ratios of the CEO pay constant. We also have to adjust for the number of directors 
and commissioners of the boards. 
The equation is formulated on the following basis;  
                                                                
The ratios of the total remuneration number are given as; 
         ( )             
          (  )              
             ( )             
To find the part of each, the rates above are multiplied with CEO pay, n, and the number of 
people relevant.  We are now ready to formulate the equation; 
Equation 1:                          (      )  (       )  (      ) 
We want to find CEO pay, then consequently solving for n; 
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Equation 2:   
                   
[(     ) (      ) (     )  ]
 
When knowing n we can calculate the remuneration for the others as well.  
In cases where total BOD and BOC numbers were given independent of each other, we 
further developed the equation to deal with them. We know that Directors on approximation 
receives 90% of the President Directors pay, and Commissioners receive on approximation 
90% of President Commissioners pay; 
         ( )             
             ( )             
Given this context, the following equations are used to extract PD pay when given total BOD 
remuneration numbers; 
Equation 3:                   (        ) 
Where nPD equals the PD pay and (∑D × rDnPD) is the amount paid to all other directors. We 
can further solve for n; 
Equation 4:     
            
[(     )  ]
 
The same equations can be used to extract President Commissioner pay and Commissioner 
pay given total BOC numbers; 
Equation 5:                   (        ) 
Where nPC equals the President Commissioner pay and (∑C × rCnPC) is the amount paid to all 
other commissioners. We can further solve for n; 
Equation 6:     
             
[(     )  ]
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We made an Excel-sheet to further improve efficiency with the calculations; 
 
The CEO-pay extraction equation in Excel 
 
EXAMPLE: 
Extracted from Modern Internasional Tbks’ notes to Financial Statements; 
“Salaries and allowances incurred for the Company‟s directors and commissioners totaled 
Rp5,162,001,000 and Rp5,848,255,512 in 2009 and 2008, respectively.” 
In the example we will focus on the 2009 figure. 
In 2009, the composition of the boards wore as follows; 1 President Director (CEO), 3 
Directors, 1 President Commissioner and 2 Commissioners. 
From Equation 1: 
                (      )  (     )  (       ) 
 
 
108 
Solve for n; 
  
             
[(      )  (      )  (      )   ]
 
                
According to this approximation the CEO are compensated with Rp 1,07 billion. We can 
further solve for the other variables. Each director will be compensated with Rp 963,9 million, 
the President Commissioner with Rp 428,4 million and each commissioner will receive Rp 
385,5 million. 
Feeding the numbers in to the Excel sheet: 
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Graphically we can illustrate the distribution in a bar chart: 
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Appendix 3 – SPSS Output from Correlation Analysis 2009 
Correlation 2009 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
lnCEOpay2009 20.9823 .94816 46 
lnCEOtenure2008 .9768 1.25628 46 
lnFirmsize2008 7.0033 2.08551 46 
MeanROE070809 20.2990 67.70207 46 
Family owned (yes/no) 2008 .41 .498 46 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
.22 .417 46 
BOC size 2008 4.65 1.828 46 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
39.17% 16.501% 46 
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lnCEOpay2009 lnFirmsize2008 MeanROE070809 
Family 
owned 
(yes/no) 
2008 
CPY owned by 
Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
BOC 
size 
2008 
Percentage of 
Independent BOC 
members 2008 
lnCEOpay2009 Pearson Correlation 1 .721
**
 .069 -.322
*
 .447
**
 .410
**
 .229 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .648 .029 .002 .005 .126 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
lnFirmsize2008 Pearson Correlation .721
**
 1 .149 -.522
**
 .442
**
 .478
**
 .045 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .323 .000 .002 .001 .765 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
MeanROE070809 Pearson Correlation .069 .149 1 -.199 .025 -.030 -.070 
Sig. (2-tailed) .648 .323  .185 .867 .844 .645 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Family owned (yes/no) 
2008 
Pearson Correlation -.322
*
 -.522
**
 -.199 1 -.442
**
 -.083 -.013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .000 .185  .002 .584 .932 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
Pearson Correlation .447
**
 .442
**
 .025 -.442
**
 1 .160 .156 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .002 .867 .002  .289 .300 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
BOC size 2008 Pearson Correlation .410
**
 .478
**
 -.030 -.083 .160 1 .005 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .001 .844 .584 .289  .976 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
Pearson Correlation .229 .045 -.070 -.013 .156 .005 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .126 .765 .645 .932 .300 .976  
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
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Appendix 4 - SPSS Output from Correlation Analysis 2008 
Correlation 2008 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
lnCEOpay2008 20.8965 .93163 46 
lnCEOtenure2007 1.1053 1.33035 46 
lnFirmsize2007 6.8043 1.80732 46 
MeanROE0708 22.4162 86.92279 46 
Family owned (yes/no) 2007 .39 .493 46 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2007 
.22 .417 46 
Kolonne1BOC size 2007 4.65 1.622 46 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2007 
39.40% 13.172% 46 
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lnCEOpay2008 lnFirmsize2007 MeanROE0708 
Family 
owned 
(yes/no) 
2007 
CPY owned by 
Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 
2007 
Kolonne1BOC 
size 2007 
Percentage of 
Independent BOC 
members 2007 
lnCEOpay2008 Pearson Correlation 1 .742
**
 .074 -.256 .415
**
 .215 .078 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .624 .086 .004 .151 .609 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
lnFirmsize2007 Pearson Correlation .742
**
 1 .129 -.458
**
 .512
**
 .333
*
 .072 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .394 .001 .000 .024 .634 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
MeanROE0708 Pearson Correlation .074 .129 1 -.166 -.001 -.048 -.138 
Sig. (2-tailed) .624 .394  .271 .994 .750 .359 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Family owned (yes/no) 
2007 
Pearson Correlation -.256 -.458
**
 -.166 1 -.423
**
 -.076 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .086 .001 .271  .003 .615 .969 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CPY owned by 
Government (YES=1, 
NO=0) 2007 
Pearson Correlation .415
**
 .512
**
 -.001 -.423
**
 1 .213 .159 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .994 .003  .156 .291 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
BOC size 2007 Pearson Correlation .215 .333
*
 -.048 -.076 .213 1 .173 
Sig. (2-tailed) .151 .024 .750 .615 .156  .249 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Percentage of 
Independent BOC 
members 2007 
Pearson Correlation .078 .072 -.138 -.006 .159 .173 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .609 .634 .359 .969 .291 .249  
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
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Appendix 5 – SPSS Output from Regression Analysis 2009 
Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Model  1: 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 
1 .556
a
 .310 .086 .90638 
2 .851
b
 .724 .557 .63138 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, 
Misc ind., Basic ind., Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service 
& Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, 
Misc ind., Basic ind., Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service 
& Inv., Percentage of Independent BOC members 2008, MeanROE070809, 
BOC size 2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008, Family 
owned (yes/no) 2008, lnFirmsize2008 
 
ANOVA
c
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 12.523 11 1.138 1.386 .224
a
 
Residual 27.932 34 .822   
Total 40.455 45    
2 Regression 29.293 17 1.723 4.322 .000
b
 
Residual 11.162 28 .399   
Total 40.455 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., 
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., 
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv., Percentage of Independent BOC members 2008, 
MeanROE070809, BOC size 2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008, Family 
owned (yes/no) 2008, lnFirmsize2008 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
 
(Constant) 21.125 .313  67.507 .000   
Mining -.555 .967 -.086 -.574 .570 .899 1.113 
Agriculture .720 .968 .112 .744 .462 .897 1.115 
Consumer goods -.098 .542 -.030 -.181 .857 .766 1.306 
Misc ind. .228 .710 .050 .321 .750 .853 1.172 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.646 .431 -.261 -1.498 .143 .669 1.494 
Manufacture .813 .604 .214 1.344 .188 .802 1.247 
Trade, Service & Inv. .118 .448 .048 .263 .794 .619 1.616 
Basic ind. .526 .602 .139 .874 .388 .807 1.239 
Property/Real estate -.412 .515 -.148 -.800 .429 .594 1.684 
lnCEOtenure2008 -.223 .130 -.295 -1.716 .095 .685 1.460 
CEO2008EducationLevel .257 .296 .137 .869 .391 .816 1.225 
2 (Constant) 17.966 .574  31.293 .000   
Mining -.198 .730 -.031 -.271 .788 .764 1.309 
Agriculture 1.030 .709 .160 1.454 .157 .811 1.233 
Consumer goods -.099 .394 -.030 -.251 .804 .703 1.422 
Misc ind. .155 .527 .034 .294 .771 .750 1.333 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.285 .354 -.115 -.805 .427 .482 2.075 
Manufacture .184 .459 .048 .400 .692 .675 1.481 
Trade, Service & Inv. .693 .347 .280 2.000 .055 .502 1.992 
 
116 
Basic ind. .202 .444 .053 .455 .653 .721 1.387 
Property/Real estate -.187 .392 -.067 -.476 .638 .497 2.010 
lnCEOtenure2008 -.013 .100 -.017 -.131 .897 .564 1.772 
CEO2008EducationLevel .035 .221 .019 .157 .876 .710 1.408 
lnFirmsize2008 .288 .073 .633 3.937 .000 .381 2.621 
MeanROE070809 -7.743E-5 .002 -.006 -.050 .961 .799 1.252 
Family owned (yes/no) 2008 .217 .276 .114 .787 .438 .469 2.131 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
.398 .295 .175 1.350 .188 .587 1.704 
BOC size 2008 .082 .069 .158 1.182 .247 .550 1.818 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
.009 .006 .157 1.510 .142 .915 1.093 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Model 2: 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 
1 .765
a
 .585 .521 .65602 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 
2008, BOC size 2008, MeanROE070809, Family owned (yes/no) 
2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008, 
lnFirmsize2008 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.671 6 3.945 9.167 .000
a
 
Residual 16.784 39 .430   
Total 40.455 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 2008, BOC size 2008, MeanROE070809, 
Family owned (yes/no) 2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008, lnFirmsize2008 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 18.150 .508  35.754 .000   
lnFirmsize2008 .298 .066 .656 4.498 .000 .499 2.002 
MeanROE070809 2.590E-5 .001 .002 .017 .986 .939 1.065 
Family owned (yes/no) 2008 .192 .248 .101 .774 .443 .627 1.595 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
.367 .277 .161 1.326 .193 .719 1.391 
BOC size 2008 .041 .063 .078 .649 .520 .727 1.375 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
.010 .006 .175 1.668 .103 .967 1.034 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Model 3: 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i 
1 .556
a
 .310 .086 .90638 
2 .847
b
 .718 .577 .61673 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real 
estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, 
Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real 
estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, 
Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv., Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008, BOC size 2008, CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008, lnFirmsize2008 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
 
ANOVA
c
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 12.523 11 1.138 1.386 .224
a
 
Residual 27.932 34 .822   
Total 40.455 45    
2 Regression 29.044 15 1.936 5.091 .000
b
 
Residual 11.411 30 .380   
Total 40.455 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., 
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2008EducationLevel, Property/Real estate, Misc ind., Basic ind., 
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture, Consumer goods, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, 
lnCEOtenure2008, Trade, Service & Inv., Percentage of Independent BOC members 2008, BOC 
size 2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008, lnFirmsize2008 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 21.125 .313  67.507 .000   
Mining -.555 .967 -.086 -.574 .570 .899 1.113 
Agriculture .720 .968 .112 .744 .462 .897 1.115 
Consumer goods -.098 .542 -.030 -.181 .857 .766 1.306 
Misc ind. .228 .710 .050 .321 .750 .853 1.172 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.646 .431 -.261 -1.498 .143 .669 1.494 
Manufacture .813 .604 .214 1.344 .188 .802 1.247 
Trade, Service & Inv. .118 .448 .048 .263 .794 .619 1.616 
Basic ind. .526 .602 .139 .874 .388 .807 1.239 
Property/Real estate -.412 .515 -.148 -.800 .429 .594 1.684 
lnCEOtenure2008 -.223 .130 -.295 -1.716 .095 .685 1.460 
CEO2008EducationLevel .257 .296 .137 .869 .391 .816 1.225 
2 (Constant) 18.087 .529  34.201 .000   
Mining -.032 .679 -.005 -.047 .963 .843 1.186 
Agriculture 1.024 .681 .159 1.503 .143 .838 1.193 
Consumer goods -.075 .375 -.023 -.200 .843 .741 1.350 
Misc ind. .221 .500 .048 .442 .662 .795 1.258 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.213 .320 -.086 -.664 .512 .561 1.782 
Manufacture .189 .441 .050 .430 .670 .699 1.431 
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Trade, Service & Inv. .755 .325 .305 2.324 .027 .545 1.835 
Basic ind. .229 .427 .060 .535 .597 .742 1.347 
Property/Real estate -.107 .364 -.038 -.294 .771 .551 1.816 
lnCEOtenure2008 -.009 .095 -.012 -.091 .928 .588 1.700 
CEO2008EducationLevel .085 .206 .045 .413 .683 .776 1.288 
lnFirmsize2008 .264 .064 .580 4.092 .000 .469 2.134 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
.368 .278 .162 1.326 .195 .629 1.590 
BOC size 2008 .097 .065 .187 1.488 .147 .598 1.673 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
.009 .006 .157 1.549 .132 .915 1.093 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Model 4: 
 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d 
1 .756
a
 .571 .541 .64266 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 
2008, lnFirmsize2008, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 
2008 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.109 3 7.703 18.651 .000
a
 
Residual 17.346 42 .413   
Total 40.455 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 2008, lnFirmsize2008, CPY 
owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18.428 .420  43.851 .000 
lnFirmsize2008 .298 .051 .656 5.818 .000 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2008 
.293 .259 .129 1.132 .264 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2008 
.010 .006 .179 1.749 .088 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2009 
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Appendix 6 - SPSS Output from Regression Analysis 2008 
Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Model 1 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i 
1 .495
a
 .245 .000 .93147 
2 .823
b
 .678 .482 .67070 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic 
ind., Manufacture, Mining, Agriculture, Property/Real estate, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic 
ind., Manufacture, Mining, Agriculture, Property/Real estate, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv., Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2007, MeanROE0708, lnFirmsize2007, Kolonne1BOC 
size 2007, Family owned (yes/no) 2007, CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2007 
 
ANOVA
c
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.558 11 .869 1.001 .465
a
 
Residual 29.499 34 .868   
Total 39.057 45    
2 Regression 26.462 17 1.557 3.460 .002
b
 
Residual 12.595 28 .450   
Total 39.057 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic ind., Manufacture, Mining, 
Agriculture, Property/Real estate, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic ind., Manufacture, Mining, 
Agriculture, Property/Real estate, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv., Percentage of Independent BOC members 2007, 
MeanROE0708, lnFirmsize2007, Kolonne1BOC size 2007, Family owned (yes/no) 2007, CPY 
owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 21.234 .363  58.522 .000   
Mining -.554 1.001 -.088 -.554 .583 .886 1.129 
Agriculture .533 .992 .084 .538 .594 .901 1.109 
Consumer goods -.362 .573 -.111 -.632 .531 .723 1.383 
Misc ind. .207 .724 .046 .287 .776 .866 1.155 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.746 .464 -.307 -1.609 .117 .610 1.640 
Manufacture .488 .643 .131 .759 .453 .749 1.336 
Trade, Service & Inv. -.020 .458 -.008 -.044 .965 .625 1.599 
Basic ind. .390 .653 .105 .597 .554 .725 1.379 
Property/Real estate -.689 .486 -.252 -1.418 .165 .705 1.418 
lnCEOtenure2007 -.099 .124 -.141 -.793 .433 .704 1.420 
CEO2007EducationLevel -.072 .320 -.039 -.225 .823 .740 1.351 
2 (Constant) 18.099 .674  26.837 .000   
Mining -.368 .803 -.058 -.458 .650 .713 1.403 
Agriculture .557 .735 .088 .758 .455 .852 1.174 
Consumer goods -.352 .433 -.108 -.813 .423 .657 1.523 
Misc ind. .167 .580 .037 .289 .775 .699 1.430 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.227 .393 -.093 -.577 .569 .440 2.273 
Manufacture .492 .500 .132 .983 .334 .641 1.560 
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Trade, Service & Inv. .481 .398 .198 1.209 .237 .429 2.331 
Basic ind. .280 .510 .075 .549 .587 .616 1.623 
Property/Real estate -.301 .399 -.110 -.754 .457 .541 1.849 
lnCEOtenure2007 .013 .099 .019 .135 .893 .578 1.729 
CEO2007EducationLevel -.240 .250 -.129 -.960 .345 .633 1.581 
lnFirmsize2007 .382 .077 .741 4.968 .000 .517 1.933 
MeanROE0708 .000 .001 .022 .178 .860 .752 1.330 
Family owned (yes/no) 2007 .357 .276 .189 1.294 .206 .540 1.854 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2007 
.207 .333 .092 .620 .540 .518 1.932 
Kolonne1BOC size 2007 -.009 .077 -.015 -.113 .911 .636 1.573 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2007 
.003 .008 .046 .394 .696 .859 1.164 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Model 2: 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d 
1 .752
a
 .566 .499 .65938 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 
2007, Family owned (yes/no) 2007, Kolonne1BOC size 2007, 
MeanROE0708, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, NO=0) 2007, 
lnFirmsize2007 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.101 6 3.683 8.472 .000
a
 
Residual 16.956 39 .435   
Total 39.057 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Independent BOC members 2007, Family owned 
(yes/no) 2007, Kolonne1BOC size 2007, MeanROE0708, CPY owned by Government (YES=1, 
NO=0) 2007, lnFirmsize2007 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 18.133 .570  31.835 .000   
lnFirmsize2007 .400 .070 .776 5.718 .000 .604 1.656 
MeanROE0708 -4.984E-5 .001 -.005 -.043 .966 .937 1.068 
Family owned (yes/no) 2007 .242 .235 .128 1.030 .310 .719 1.390 
CPY owned by Government 
(YES=1, NO=0) 2007 
.179 .288 .080 .621 .538 .669 1.495 
Kolonne1BOC size 2007 -.031 .066 -.054 -.470 .641 .854 1.170 
Percentage of Independent 
BOC members 2007 
.001 .008 .018 .167 .868 .935 1.070 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Model 3: 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i 
1 .495
a
 .245 .000 .93147 
2 .819
b
 .671 .537 .63416 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic 
ind., Manufacture, Mining, Agriculture, Property/Real estate, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic 
ind., Manufacture, Mining, Agriculture, Property/Real estate, 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv., lnFirmsize2007, Family 
owned (yes/no) 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
 
 
ANOVA
c
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.558 11 .869 1.001 .465
a
 
Residual 29.499 34 .868   
Total 39.057 45    
2 Regression 26.188 13 2.014 5.009 .000
b
 
Residual 12.869 32 .402   
Total 39.057 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic ind., Manufacture, Mining, 
Agriculture, Property/Real estate, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CEO2007EducationLevel, Misc ind., Basic ind., Manufacture, Mining, 
Agriculture, Property/Real estate, Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation, Consumer goods, 
lnCEOtenure2007, Trade, Service & Inv., lnFirmsize2007, Family owned (yes/no) 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 21.234 .363  58.522 .000   
Mining -.554 1.001 -.088 -.554 .583 .886 1.129 
Agriculture .533 .992 .084 .538 .594 .901 1.109 
Consumer goods -.362 .573 -.111 -.632 .531 .723 1.383 
Misc ind. .207 .724 .046 .287 .776 .866 1.155 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.746 .464 -.307 -1.609 .117 .610 1.640 
Manufacture .488 .643 .131 .759 .453 .749 1.336 
Trade, Service & Inv. -.020 .458 -.008 -.044 .965 .625 1.599 
Basic ind. .390 .653 .105 .597 .554 .725 1.379 
Property/Real estate -.689 .486 -.252 -1.418 .165 .705 1.418 
lnCEOtenure2007 -.099 .124 -.141 -.793 .433 .704 1.420 
CEO2007EducationLevel -.072 .320 -.039 -.225 .823 .740 1.351 
2 (Constant) 18.191 .537  33.876 .000   
Mining -.489 .711 -.077 -.688 .496 .814 1.228 
Agriculture .459 .675 .073 .679 .502 .901 1.110 
Consumer goods -.391 .395 -.120 -.991 .329 .707 1.415 
Misc ind. .029 .505 .006 .057 .955 .825 1.211 
Infrastructure, Utilities & 
Transportation 
-.317 .336 -.130 -.944 .352 .539 1.854 
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Manufacture .411 .438 .110 .938 .355 .748 1.337 
Trade, Service & Inv. .403 .337 .166 1.194 .241 .534 1.871 
Basic ind. .195 .452 .052 .431 .669 .701 1.426 
Property/Real estate -.369 .355 -.135 -1.041 .305 .613 1.633 
lnCEOtenure2007 -.003 .087 -.004 -.031 .976 .671 1.490 
CEO2007EducationLevel -.200 .224 -.108 -.892 .379 .702 1.424 
lnFirmsize2007 .399 .063 .774 6.344 .000 .691 1.447 
Family owned (yes/no) 2007 .327 .251 .173 1.305 .201 .584 1.712 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Model 4: 
 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d 
1 .748
a
 .559 .538 .63297 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Family owned (yes/no) 2007, lnFirmsize2007 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 21.829 2 10.915 27.242 .000
a
 
Residual 17.228 43 .401   
Total 39.057 45    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Family owned (yes/no) 2007, lnFirmsize2007 
b. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 18.049 .454  39.749 .000   
lnFirmsize2007 .407 .059 .790 6.934 .000 .791 1.265 
Family owned (yes/no) 2007 .198 .215 .105 .923 .361 .791 1.265 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCEOpay2008 
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